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Speed, law and the global economy: How economic acceleration contributes to inequality and precarity

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 June 2020

Nicolás M. Perrone
Nicolás M. Perrone*
Affiliation:
Universidad Andres Bello. Facultad de Derecho. Campus Viña del Mar, Chile
*
Email: nicolas.perrone@unab.cl
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Abstract

The law is implicated in many of the relations that produce inequality and precarity in the global economy. It contributes in different ways to the unequal bargaining power between states, capital, and labour. One way that has attracted less attention so far relates to how the law accelerates economic relations. This article examines the role of law in the global economy not by focusing on the international economic institutions, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the European Union (EU) or the International Monetary Fund (IMF), but on the transactions that plug maquila workers and freelancers into the global economy. The argument is that the speed of these economic relations favours those who command international production, creating what Hartmut Rosa calls a ‘frenetic standstill’. Importantly, the law can also contribute to changing these bargaining dynamics by slowing down some of these transactions and facilitating their territorial re-embedding. This strategy, however, requires a better understanding of the role of law in transnational networks of contracts as well as more state and non-state international co-ordination: The opposite of nationalist attitudes, such as Brexit and Trump’s trade policy.

Keywords

critical theoryglobal value chainsinternational economic lawpolitical economytransnational law
Type
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Information
Leiden Journal of International Law , Volume 33 , Issue 3 , September 2020 , pp. 557 - 576
Copyright
© Foundation of the Leiden Journal of International Law 2020

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Footnotes

1

I am grateful to Andrew Lang, David Schneiderman, Robert Schütze, William Lucy, John Linarelli, Nicole Selamé Glena, and the participants of the IEL Collective Inaugural Conference for their comments and suggestions. All errors remain mine only.

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