We investigate the sectoral and the distributional effects of a food subsidy program, where food consumption in the economy is subsidized by taxing the manufacturing good producers. In a two-agent model comprising of farmer and industrialist households, agents consume food to accumulate health. Simulations indicate that while the subsidy program increases food output and agents’ health both in the short run and the long run, manufacturing output and aggregate real GDP appear to fall in the short run and increase only in the long run. The program does not make both agents better off and exhibits social welfare gains for a limited range of subsidies.

We identify volatility breaks in all testable series in the FRED database over the 1957–2013 period. This yields 17,681 breaks, which we categorize using text analysis. We show that 70.5% of series categories experienced a decline in volatility over the 1985–1999 period, suggesting that the Great Moderation was far broader in scope than the literature has documented. We also show that this decline reversed in 2000, leading to a sharp increase in volatility for most time series categories; however, this did not fully materialize in GDP volatility until the Great Recession. Finally, we identify labor markets, demographics, finance, and government debt as potential drivers of low-frequency shifts in volatility over the 1957–2013 period.

Adoption of better technologies is a crucial way for developing countries to close productivity gaps with leading economies. However, the possibility of growing through technological adoption depends decisively on the country’s absorptive capacity. We build a theoretical model of technology adoption that focuses on four factors that shape the countries’ technological absorptive capacity, namely: (i) years of education; (ii) quality of the educational system; (iii) barriers that impede the entry and exit of firms; and (iv) the institutions that enhance or impede the diffusion of new technologies. We calibrate the model for a sample of 86 economies. The USA is our benchmark leading economy. We disentangle the relative weight of each development factor in explaining per capita income differences and study patterns in relationships between the type of development barrier and the level of development. Our results show that in relative terms, years of education and education system quality along with high barriers to opening new firms are the main impediments that middle- to high-income economies face in closing the gap with the USA. Education as a whole (quality plus years of education) explains 50% of the gap between high-income countries (HICs) and the USA, while the entry costs account for nearly 25% of this gap. A remarkable result is the small effect that individual reforms have on steady-state productivity in low-income countries (LICs). Outside of institutional framework, the remaining three factors are individually responsible for less than 15% of the gap. This result is explained by poor global absorptive capacity that reduces the effect of each factor when implemented individually. In fact, there are significant nonlinearities between development level and the effects of individual reforms, which are due to the strong complementarities between the different development factors.

In this paper, we make the case that an argument for price-level targeting over inflation targeting need not to be based on some overly restrictive assumptions. We adopt a theoretical framework that deviates from the assumption of rational expectation, and that takes into account the cognitive limitations and a “trial and error” learning mechanism of the agents. The (im)perfect credibility of various monetary policies (e.g., a Taylor-type rule, strict domestic inflation targeting, strict consumer price index (CPI) inflation targeting, exchange rate peg, and domestic price-level and CPI-level targeting) may lead agents to react according to their expectation rules, and then create various degrees of booms and busts in output and inflation. Therefore, relaxing the rational expectation hypothesis has potential consequences for policy planning. We find that price-level targeting prevails over inflation targeting even under different expectation formation and even when the announced inflation target is not fully credible. The counterfactual analysis and sensitivity test confirm that CPI-level targeting is the most effective for improving social welfare and stability in an open economy. The business cycles induced by animal spirits are enhanced by strict inflation targeting.

We examine the impact of balanced-budget labor income taxes on the existence of expectation-driven business cycles in a two-sector version of the Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (SGU) [(1997) Journal of Political Economy 105, 976–1000] model with constant government expenditures and counter-cyclical taxes. Our results show that the destabilizing impact of labor income taxes strongly depends on the capital intensity difference across sectors. Local indeterminacy is indeed more likely when the consumption good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate decreases, and less likely when the investment good sector is capital intensive, as the minimal tax rate increases. The implication of this result can be quantitatively significant. Indeed, when compared to SGU, local indeterminacy can be either completely ruled out for all OECD countries when the investment good is sufficiently capital intensive or drastically improved, delivering indeterminacy for a larger set of OECD countries, if the consumption good is sufficiently capital intensive. Focusing however on recent estimates of the sectoral capital shares corresponding to the empirically plausible case of a capital intensive consumption good, we find that there is a significant increase of the range of economically relevant labor tax rates (from a minimum tax rate of 30% to 24.7% for which local indeterminacy arises with respect to the aggregate formulation of SGU.

It has repeatedly been shown that properly constructed monetary aggregates based on index number theory (such as Divisia money) vastly outperform traditional measures of money (i.e. simple sum money) in empirical models. However, opponents of Divisia frequently claim that Divisia is “too complex” for little gain. And indeed, at first glance it looks as if simple sum and Divisia sum exhibit similar dynamics. In this paper, we want to build deeper understanding of how and when Divisia and simple sum differ empirically using monthly US data from 1990M1 to 2007M12. In particular, we look at how they respond differently to monetary policy shocks, which seems to be the most essential aspect of those differences from the perspective of the policy maker. We use a very rich, fairly agnostic setup that allows us to identify many potential nonlinearities, building on a smoothed local projections approach with automatic selection of the relevant interaction terms. We find, that—while the direction of change is often similar—the precise dynamics differ sharply. In particular in times of economic uncertainty, when the proper assessment of monetary policy is most relevant, those existing differences are drastically augmented.

This note uses monotone methods to derive two sets of comparative statics results for monetary directed search models. First, it characterizes the impact of a higher inflation rate or a higher cost of using credit on market outcomes, regardless of the choice of matching function. Second, the seller-to-buyer ratio, output level, and money demand increase as the matching function becomes more efficient in a log-supermodular sense. I also consider an extension with endogenous search intensity and show that search intensity and trade volume always decrease in the nominal interest rate.

We analyze the channels through which institutional quality can impact the corruption–growth nexus. To do this, we develop an endogenous growth model and test its implications empirically, through panel data models using GMM and PSTR settings. Our sample consists of 136 developed and developing countries analyzed over the period 1984–2015. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that (i) the corruption–growth relation can be subject to nonlinearities highly influenced by countries’ institutional development; and (ii) private investment and public spending are two main channels through which institutional quality affects, positively or negatively, the relation between corruption and economic growth.