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Quantum attacks on pseudorandom generators†

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 December 2012

ELLOÁ B. GUEDES ,
F. M. DE ASSIS  and
BERNARDO LULA JR.
ELLOÁ B. GUEDES
Affiliation:
IQuanta–Institute for Studies in Quantum Computation and Information, Federal University of Campina Grande, Av. Aprígio Veloso, 882–CZ.A, 58429-140, Campina Grande–PB, Brazil Email: elloaguedes@gmail.com; fmarcos@dee.ufcg.edu.br; lula@dsc.ufcg.edu.br
F. M. DE ASSIS
Affiliation:
IQuanta–Institute for Studies in Quantum Computation and Information, Federal University of Campina Grande, Av. Aprígio Veloso, 882–CZ.A, 58429-140, Campina Grande–PB, Brazil Email: elloaguedes@gmail.com; fmarcos@dee.ufcg.edu.br; lula@dsc.ufcg.edu.br
BERNARDO LULA JR.
Affiliation:
IQuanta–Institute for Studies in Quantum Computation and Information, Federal University of Campina Grande, Av. Aprígio Veloso, 882–CZ.A, 58429-140, Campina Grande–PB, Brazil Email: elloaguedes@gmail.com; fmarcos@dee.ufcg.edu.br; lula@dsc.ufcg.edu.br
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Abstract

There are advantages in the use of quantum computing in the elaboration of attacks on certain pseudorandom generators when compared with analogous attacks using classical computing. This paper presents a polynomial time quantum attack on the Blum–Micali generator, which is considered secure against threats from classical computers. The proposed attack uses a Grover inspired procedure together with the quantum discrete logarithm, and is able to recover previous and future outputs of the generator under attack, thereby completely compromising its unpredictability. The attack can also be adapted to other generators, such as Blum–Micali generators with multiple hard-core predicates and generators from the Blum–Micali construction, and also to scenarios where the requirements on the bits are relaxed. Such attacks represent a threat to the security of the pseudorandom generators adopted in many real-world cryptosystems.

Type
Paper
Information
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science , Volume 23 , Issue 3 , June 2013 , pp. 608 - 634
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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Footnotes

†

The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support given by the Brazilian Funding Agencies CAPES and CNPq.

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