Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-26T21:27:33.948Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Hospital Corporate Liability: The Trend Continues

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Lee J. Dunn Jr.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

Traditionally, hospitals have been liable for the acts of their employees or agents under the doctrine of respondeat superior, but have not been considered liable for the actions of those whom they did not employ or over whom they had no control. Accordingly, hospitals and their insurers were able to avoid legal responsibility for the acts of medical malpractice committed by physicians on their medical staffs. Although elements of a new and distinct theory of hospital corporate responsibility unrelated to respondeat superior had emerged before, the widely discussed opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling v. Charleston Community Hospital is generally considered the hallmark of a change in judicial thinking in respect to a hospital's duty to monitor the quality of care rendered within its walls. However, Darling was not a forerunner of a spate of similar holdings, and, in fact, has never been specifically relied upon even in Illinois. Only in the last several years have significant additional strides been taken in developing this theory. Two recent intermediate appellate decisions in Wisconsin and North Carolina seem to reflect the trend of the law and the affirmative duty of a hospital to monitor the quality of care rendered by its medical staff.

Type
Hospital Law
Information
Medicolegal News , Volume 8 , Issue 5 , October 1980 , pp. 16 - 29
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1980

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

See, e.g., Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957); Foster v. Englewood Hospital Ass'n, 313 N.E.2d 255 (Ill. 1972).Google Scholar
See, e.g., Hundt v. Proctor Community Hospital, 5 Ill. App. 3d 987 (1972); Johnson v. St. Bernard Hospital, 399 N.E.2d 198 (Ill. 1979).Google Scholar
See, e.g., Payne, Recent Developments Affecting a Hospital's Liability for Negligence of Physicians, 18 South Texas Law Journal 367 (1977).Google Scholar
Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 (1966).Google Scholar
The probable reason for this is that in Darling the Supreme Court of Illinois never specifically held that the physician treating the student was an agent or employee (either expressly or constructively) of the defendant hospital. See, e.g., Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 235 N.E.2d 671 (Ill. App. 1968); Stogsdill v. Manor Convalescent Home, Inc., 343 N.E.2d 589 (Ill. App. 1976).Google Scholar
See, e.g., Fiorentino v. Wenger, 227 N.E.2d 296 (N.Y. 1967); Mauer v. Highland Park Hospital Foundation, 232 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. 1976) (in dicta, hospital may be liable for careless or imprudent selection of staff); Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. 1972); Joiner v. Mitchell County Hospital Authority, 186 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. 1971); Corleto v. Shore Memorial Hospital, 350 A.2d 534 (N.J. 1975).Google Scholar
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital, 294 N.W.2d 501 (Wisc. App. 1980).Google Scholar
Id. at 505.Google Scholar
Id. at 506.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id. at 513.Google Scholar
The court observed that Misericordia should have known of the restrictions placed on Dr. Salinsky's practice by other Milwaukee hospitals, and that one hospital had denied him staff privileges, and that ten malpractice suits had been filed against Dr. Salinsky at the time he applied for clinical privileges. Id. at 520.Google Scholar
Id. at 518.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id. at 519.Google Scholar
Id. at 520.Google Scholar
The court also dismissed the hospital's argument that, if the operation had not occurred at Misericordia, it would have happened elsewhere, because Misericordia was unable to prove that Dr. Salinsky could have performed the operation elsewhere due to the severe limitations on his privileges at other Milwaukee hospitals. Id. at 522–23.Google Scholar
Id. at 523.Google Scholar
Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391 (N.C. App. 1980).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bing v. Thunig, supra note 1.Google Scholar
Bost v. Riley, supra note 19, at 396.Google Scholar
Id. The court cited [1] “the duty to make a reasonable inspection of equipment it uses in the treatment of patients and remedy any defects discoverable by such inspection..., [2] [the duty to] provide equipment reasonably suited for the use intended..., [3] the duty not to obey instructions of a physician which are obviously negligent or dangerous..., [4] [the duty to] promulgate adequate safety rules relating to the handling, storage, and administering of medications..., and [5] to adequately investigate the credentials of a physician selected to practice at the facility.” Id. at 396 (citations omitted).Google Scholar