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Perceptions and purpose of the bomb: Explaining India's nuclear restraint against China

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2021

Yogesh Joshi Open the ORCID record for Yogesh Joshi [Opens in a new window]
Yogesh Joshi*
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Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore, Singapore
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Email: yogeshjoshi@nus.edu.sg
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Abstract

Much of the literature on India's nuclear programme assumes that China's nuclear capability drove New Delhi, the strategically weaker actor, to pursue a nuclear weapons capability. China's nuclear tests not only rendered New Delhi militarily insecure and dented its claim for the leadership of the Third World but they also polarized the domestic debate over the utility of the bomb. In the global scheme of nuclear proliferation, therefore, India was just another fallen nuclear domino. Marshalling recently declassified documents, this article revisits India's nuclear behaviour during the crucial decade between 1964 and 1974. By focusing on threat assessments made at the highest levels and internal deliberations of the Indian Government, this article shows how, contrary to the claims made in the literature, Indian decision-makers did not make much of the Chinese nuclear threat. This conviction emanated out of their distinct reading of the purpose of nuclear weapons in China's foreign and military policy; their perceptions of how India could achieve nuclear deterrence against China by using the bipolar international politics of the Cold War; and, finally, their understanding of the political costs of developing an indigenous nuclear response to China's nuclear threat. New Delhi's nuclear restraint resulted from its perceptions of Chinese nuclear intentions and its beliefs about the purpose of the bomb in Sino-Indian relations. India's perceptions of China as a nuclear adversary and its decision-makers’ views on the purpose of nuclear weapons in this rivalry were fundamentally different from the expectations set out by the domino theory of nuclear proliferation.

Keywords

Nuclear proliferationIndiaChinanuclear weaponsthreat perceptions
Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 56 , Issue 4 , July 2022 , pp. 1083 - 1124
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Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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References

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11 Even the 1998 nuclear tests were rationalized by the Indian Government by the China threat theory. See ‘Nuclear Anxiety; Indian's Letter to Clinton on the Nuclear Testing’, The New York Times, 13 May 1998, p. A14. For an internal Indian Government memo making arguments similar to the domino theory, see National Archives of India (NAI), ‘India and the Chinese Bomb’, 26 November 1964, Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), HI/1012 (14)/64 Volume II. For status as an argument for the bomb, see Homi Bhabha's comments in LBJPL, ‘Glenn Seaborg to Bhabha’, 19 March 1965, NSF (Files of Robert W. Kromer), Box 25. Also see Raj Krishna, ‘A Limited Programme’, Seminar, No. 65 (January 1965), pp. 20–23 and R. Krishna, ‘India and the Bomb’, India Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April–June 1965), pp. 119–137; Romesh Thapar, ‘To Be or Not to Be’, Seminar, No. 65 (January 1965); K. Subrahmanyam, ‘A Strategy for India for a Credible Posture against a Nuclear Adversary’, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, November 1968, pp. 1–13; Subramaniam Swamy, ‘Defence and Economic Growth in India: A Study in an Inseparable Relationship’, Jana Deep Souvenir (A Publication brought out on the occasion of the 15th Annual Session of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Bombay, April 25–27, 1969), pp. 67–87; Subramaniam Swamy, ‘India's Nuclear Strategy in the 1970s’, Shakti, Vol. 6, No. 3 (July–September 1969); N. Sheshagiri, ‘The Bomb’, Science Today, Vol. 6, No. 4 (October 1971), pp. 23–62.

12 Yogesh Joshi, ‘The Imagined Arsenal: India's Nuclear Decision-Making, 1973–76’, Working Paper No. 6, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, June 2015, p. 38.

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21 Sarkar, ‘The Making of Non-Aligned Nuclear Power’, pp. 933–950; Miller, ‘Nuclear Dominoes’, pp. 43–54.

22 G. G. Mirachandani, India's Nuclear Dilemma (New York: Humanities Press, 1968), p. 61.

23 John Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 313.

24 P. V. R. Rao, Defence without Drift (Bombay: Popular, 1970), p. 296.

25 Joshi, ‘Waiting for the Bomb’, p. 38; Yogesh Joshi, ‘Debating the Nuclear Legacy of India and One of its Great Cold War Strategists’, War on the Rocks, 27 March 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/debating-the-nuclear-legacy-of-india-and-one-of-its-great-cold-war-strategists/, [accessed 27 September 2021].

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29 Robert Jervis, ‘Hypothesis on Misperception’, World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Apr 1968), p. 454. Also see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

30 Yarhi-Milo, Keren, ‘In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Communities Assess the Intentions of Adversaries’, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Summer 2013), pp. 7–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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32 William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, ‘Forecasting Proliferation: The Role of Theory, an Introduction’, in Willam Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (eds), Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: The Role of Theory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), Vol. 1, p. 2.

33 Robert Jervis, How Statesmen Think: The Psychology of International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), p. 191.

34 Jervis, Hypothesis on Misperception, p. 455; Jervis, How Statesmen Think, pp. 26–27.

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39 For those advocating uncertainty as the source of deterrence, see Marc Trachtenberg, ‘The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis’, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1985), pp. 137–163; Robert Jervis, ‘Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94, No. 4 (1979–1980), pp. 617–633. For credibility arguments, see Matthew Kroenig, ‘Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes’, International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1 (Winter 2013), pp. 141–171.

40 Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell, India in Nuclear Asia: Forces, Doctrines and Dangers (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019), pp. 122–140.

41 China's deterrence thinking was also highly influenced by ‘uncertainty of risk’ rather than the credibility of response. See Riqiang, Wu, ‘Certainty of Uncertainty: Nuclear Strategy with Chinese Characteristics’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No. 4 2013, pp. 579–614CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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44 Ibid., p. 314.

45 Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?’, pp. 55–56.

46 Rao, Defence without Drift, p. 295.

47 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 83.

48 Garver, Protracted Contest, pp. 314–315.

49 NAI, ‘India and the Chinese Bomb’.

50 Chakma, Towards Pokhran-II, p. 216.

51 Sarkar, ‘The Making of Non-Aligned Nuclear Power’, p. 934.

52 Ibid. p. 933.

53 Kennedy, ‘India's Nuclear Odyssey’, pp. 120–153; Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 171–203.

54 Bradley A. Thayer, ‘The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime’, Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1995), p. 471.

55 Bhatia, ‘The Nuclear Weapons Lobby in India after 1964’, pp. 79–82.

56 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace, pp. 44–58.

57 Ganguly, ‘India's Pathway to Pokhran II’, p. 175.

58 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 175.

59 Rohan Mukherjee, ‘Nuclear Ambiguity and International Status: India in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, 1962–1969’, in Manu Bhagvan (eds), India and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2019), pp. 126–150.

60 Bhatia, ‘The Nuclear Weapons Lobby’, p. 86.

61 Interview with a retired senior official of the Indian External Affairs Ministry, 17 September 2017, New Delhi. Gandhi's close confidant, P. N. Haksar, who was then chairman of India's Planning Commission, resisted further tests on economic grounds. He not only refused to ‘allot to the nuclear wallahs (scientists) sufficient resources to allow them to carry out another test’, but also believed that India could not ‘afford a programme of bangs in any case’. See Nuclear development in India (Folder 2). 1975. [From Christopher to Pakenham, 17 October 1975]. At: Place: The National Archives, Kew. [[FCO]] [[37/1715]]. Available through: Adam Matthew, Marlborough, Archives Direct, http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/Documents/Details/FCO_37_1715, [last accessed 15 May 2021].

62 Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 136–145.

63 Jervis, How Statesmen Think, p. 26.

64 Barton J. Bernstein, ‘Understanding Decision-Making, US Foreign Policy and the Cuban Missile Crisis: A Review Essay’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1995), pp. 134–164.

65 Andrew Rotter et al., ‘ Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965’, H-Diplo Roundtable Review, Vol. XVI, No. 3 (2014), https://networks.h-net.org/node/28443/discussions/41431/h-diplo-roundtable-cold-war-south-asia-britain-united-states-and, [accessed 27 September 2021].

66 NAI, ‘Chinese Bomb and its Consequences on her nuclear and political strategy’, 19 October 1964, MEA, HI/1012(14)/64 Volume II (Top Secret).

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 NAI, ‘Factual Note Regarding Lok Sabha Question No. 8196’, 30 August 1965, MEA, U.IV/125/61/65 (Secret). India's defence minister shared summarized findings of this report with parliament in March 1965. See Narayan M. Ghatate, ‘Disarmament in India's Foreign Policy, 1947–1965’, PhD thesis, American University, 1966, p. 229.

70 Similar views were expressed by veteran foreign policy bureaucrats such as R. K. Nehru and M. J. Desai. See NMML, ‘RK Nehru to Prime Minister’, Speeches/Writings-2, Files of RK Nehru, 30 October 1964 (confidential); M. J. Desai, ‘India and Nuclear Weapons’, Disarmament and Arms Control, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1965), pp. 135–142.

71 Interview with a retired Indian ambassador, 17 June 2017, Bangalore, India. (This retired diplomat was under-secretary of the China Division of the MEA in late 1964 and later became India's ambassador to Beijing.) Interview with Ambassador Satish Chandra, former Indian deputy national security adviser, 10 June 2018, New Delhi, India. In 1965–66, Chandra served directly under J. S. Mehta in the Policy Planning Division of the MEA.

72 NAI, ‘India and the Chinese Bomb’.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Ibid.

76 Interview with a retired Indian diplomat, 17 June 2017, Bangalore, India. Later, Narayanan acknowledged the silent treatment his views received within the MEA. In April 1970, as China sent its first satellite into orbit, Narayanan submitted his 1964 memo to the Indian foreign secretary for fresh consideration. By now, Narayanan was director of the Policy Planning Division (PPD) of the MEA. In his covering letter of 28 April 1970, which also included the 1964 memo, he explained, ‘The PRC has achieved a dramatic feat of sending up an earth satellite…The real departure for China took place in 1964 when the first Chinese atomic bomb was exploded at Lop Nur. I am placing below a copy of a paper I had prepared at that time on the possible consequences of the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons, particularly from the Indian point of view. I had put forward the view that the only option open to India was to go in for a nuclear programme of her own. The arguments used in the paper remain fresh and relevant even today; in fact, they are more relevant today than in 1964. I am, therefore, resubmitting this paper for your perusal.’ See NAI, ‘Note by KR Narayanan, Joint Secretary (Policy Planning)’, 28 April 1970, MEA, PP(JS)3 (3)/74 Volume II (Top Secret).

77 The author is thankful to Jayita Sarkar for sharing the State Department document. For the source, see endnote 6 in Sarkar, ‘The Making of Non-Aligned Nuclear Power’, p. 947.

78 Interview with a retired Indian diplomat, 17 June 2017, Bangalore, India.

79 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, pp. 60–65; C. P. Srivastava, Lal Bahadur Shastri: A Life of Truth in Politics, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995).

80 K. P. Mishra, ‘Foreign Policy Planning Efforts in India’, The Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4 (April 1970), pp. 386–387. Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 60; also see Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, Indian Nuclear Policy: Oxford India Short Introductions (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2018); R. L. M. Patil, India-Nuclear Weapons and International Politics (Delhi: National 1969); K. P. Mishra (ed.), Studies in Indian Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas, 1969); A. B. Shah (ed.), India's Defence and Foreign Policy (Bombay: Manak Atlas, 1969).

81 Pant and Joshi, India's Nuclear Policy, p. 52.

82 A significant claim in support of the bomb was Bhabha's assertion that a nuclear weapons programme would indeed be economically viable. Shastri went to great lengths to counter Bhabha's statements. In December 1964, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri requested the British government to offer an analysis of the cost of the bomb in case India decided to develop it. It resulted in a report prepared by the British Ministry of Defence titled ‘Indication of the Cost of an Indian Defense Capability in the Light of British Experience’. The report suggested that the financial implications of the bomb and the acquisition of a bomber force to deliver it would be exorbitant: something to the tune of $350 million with a running cost of $50 million per annum. However, as Susanna Schrafstetter has argued, these figures were highly inflated. In a confidential report which was not shared with the Indian Government, the actual costs were assumed to be significantly less. See Susanna Schrafstetter, ‘Preventing the “Smiling Buddha”: British-Indian Nuclear Relations and the Commonwealth Nuclear Force, 1964–68’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (2002), pp. 93–94.

83 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, pp. 81–82.

84 LBJPL, ‘Address of the President on Nationwide Radio and Television from the President's Office at the White House’, 18 October 1964, NSF (Committee Files), Box 10.

85 Shastri's appeal was not without precedent in Indian diplomacy. In July 1963, New Delhi had floated the idea of joint guarantees by the United States and the Soviet Union of any border settlement between India and China. See John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (JFKLP), ‘Indira Gandhi's discussions with Khrushchev and Indian Ambassador to Moscow TN Kaul’, 1 October 1963, NSF, Box 418.

86 NAI, ‘Note by AS Gonsalves, Joint Secretary (Disarmament Division)’, 7 July 1965, Prime Minister's Secretariat (PMS), 30(36)/65 PMS (Top Secret).

87 The Statesman, ‘Soviet Leadership for Conciliation, Not Confrontation—Swaran Singh’, Calcutta, 10 December 1964. One major lesson of the 1962 war for India was that any upheaval in the international environment and a crisis between the Soviet Union and the United States provided an avenue for China to exploit differences between the two superpowers to its advantage. Détente between the Great Powers was, therefore, a crucial part of the Indian strategy against China. See Srinath Raghavan, ‘The Fifty Year Crisis: India and China after 1962’, Seminar, Vol. 641, January 2013, https://www.india-seminar.com/2013/641/641_srinath_raghavan.htm, [accessed 27 September 2021]. Also see Srinath Raghavan, War and Peace in Modern India (Ranikhet: Permanent Black, 2010).

88 NAI, ‘Note by LK Jha (Principal Secretary) to the Foreign Secretary’, 23 March 1965, PMS, 30(36)/65 PMS (Secret).

89 Sarkar, ‘The Making of Non-Aligned Nuclear Power’, pp. 940–942; Chakma, ‘Towards Pokhran-II’, pp. 203–205; Kennedy, ‘India's Nuclear Odyssey’, pp. 131–133; Ganguly, ‘India's Pathway to Pokhran II’, pp. 153–155.

90 NAI, ‘Note by AS Gonsalves’.

91 LBJPL, ‘Discussion paper on prospects for intensifying peaceful atomic cooperation with India’, 23 November 1964, NSF (Committee on Nuclear Proliferation), Box 6. Also see Francis Gavin, ‘Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s’, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 100–135

92 LBJPL, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: India's Nuclear Energy Program’, 22 February 1965, NSF (Files of Robert W. Kromer), Box 25.

93 Ibid.

94 LBJPL, ‘Glenn Seaborg to Bhabha’, 19 March 1965, NSF (Files of Robert W. Kromer), Box 25.

95 Government of India, Atoms with Mission: A Golden Jubilee Commemorative Volume on Nuclear Technology Development, 1954–2004 (Mumbai: Department of Atomic Energy, 2005), p. 140.

96 Ashok Parthasarathi was a member of the DAE in the late 1960s and later joined the Prime Minister's Secretariat as a special consultant on science and technology policy. See Ashok Parthasarathi, Technology at the Core: Science and Technology with Indira Gandhi (New Delhi: Pearson-Longman, 2007), p. 17.

97 C. V. Sundaram, L. V. Krishnan and T. S. Iyenger, Atomic Energy for India: 50 Years (Bombay: Department of Atomic Energy, August 1998), p. 25.

98 NAI, ‘L.K. Jha to Prime Minister’, 23 March 1965, PMS, 30(36)/65/ PMS (Top Secret).

99 NAI, ‘Letter from C. S. Jha (Foreign Secretary) to B. K. Nehru (Indian Ambassador to Washington DC)’, 9 November 1966, MEA, WII/102/1/66 (Top Secret).

100 Ibid.

101 Joshi, ‘Waiting for the Bomb’, pp. 27–28.

102 Lorne J. Kavic, India's Quest for Security: Defense Policies, 1947–1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967).

103 Cohen, Stephen P., ‘Security Issues in South Asia’, Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 3 1975, pp. 203–215CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Cohen, Stephen P., ‘US Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 1 1976, pp. 49–69CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

104 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1964–65 (New Delhi: Government of India, March 1965), p. 1.

105 NAI, ‘Factual Note Regarding Lok Sabha Question No. 8196’.

106 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report, 1964–65, p. 2.

107 Major General D. Som Dutt, ‘India and the Bomb’, The Adelphi Paper, Vol. 6, No. 30 (1966), pp. 1–9. Also see Rao, Defence without Drift, pp. 297–300; General J. N. Chaudhuri, Arms, Aims and Aspects (Bombay: Mankatalas, 1966), p. 115.

108 On India's food crisis and its dependence upon the West, see David C. Engerman, The Price of Aid: The Economic Cold War in India (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018), pp. 227–303.

109 NMML, ‘Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's Letter to Chief Ministers of States’, 7 March 1967, MC Chagla Papers, File No. 91 (Secret).

110 Doctor, A. H., ‘India's Nuclear Policy’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 3 1971, pp. 349–356Google Scholar.

111 For a detailed explanation, see Darshana Baruah and Yogesh Joshi, ‘India's Policy on Diego Garcia and its Quest for Security in the Indian Ocean’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 1 (2021), pp. 36–59.

112 NAI, ‘Untitled Memo by A. S. Gonsalves, Joint Secretary (Disarmament Division)’, 20 January 1965, MEA, U.IV/125/24/1965 (Secret).

113 NAI, ‘Untitled Memo by Y. D. Gundevia (Foreign Secretary)’, 6 February 1965, MEA, U.IV/125/24/1965 (Secret).

114 Ibid.

115 NAI, ‘Note by L. K. Jha (Principal Secretary) to the Foreign Secretary’.

116 NAI, ‘Discussions of the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of External Affairs’, 30 August 1965, MEA, C/125/28/65/CH (Secret).

117 NAI, ‘Fortnightly Political and Economic Reports for the Period 1st–15th September 1965, Indian Embassy in Washington DC’, 23 September 1965, MEA, HI-1012(78)/65 (Secret).

118 NAI, ‘Fortnightly Political and Economic Reports for the Period 16th to 30th September 1965, Indian Embassy in Washington DC’, 11 October 1965, MEA, HI-1012(78)/65 (Secret).

119 Ibid.

120 NAI, ‘Political Report for August 1965’, 17 September 1965, MEA, HI-1012(82)/65 (Secret).

121 NAI, ‘Intelligence Report No. 9/65 for the month of September 1965’, 3 October 1965, MEA, HI-1012(82)/65 (Secret).

122 Ibid.

123 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 98.

124 Walter Goldstein, ‘Keeping the Genie in the Bottle: The Feasibility of a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreement’, Background, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Aug. 1965), pp. 137–146.

125 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 103.

126 Mukherjee, ‘Nuclear Ambiguity and International Status’, p. 144.

127 In its submission to the UNDC, India laid out five conditions for New Delhi to join the treaty. First, that nuclear powers should not transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons technology to others. Second, that nuclear powers should agree not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. Third, that the United Nations must guarantee the security of those countries that were threatened by ‘nuclear weapons or states near to possessing nuclear weapons’. Fourth, that tangible progress on nuclear disarmament was made, including a comprehensive test ban treaty, freeze on the production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, as well as a substantial reduction on existing stockpiles. Lastly, that non-nuclear powers should not acquire nuclear weapons. See Mukherjee, ‘Nuclear Ambiguity and International Status’, p. 143.

128 NAI, ‘Note for Supplementaries (On Lok Sabha Starred Q. No. 523 for 29 November 1965)’, PMS, 30(36)/65 PMS (Secret).

129 NAI, ‘Note for Supplementaries (On Lok Sabha Starred Q. No. 658 for 21st March 1966)’, PMS, 30(36)/65 PMS (Secret).

130 For internal struggles within the Congress Party during this period, see Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi: A Personal and Political Biography (New Delhi: Hay House, 1991); Katherine Frank, Indira: The Life of Indira Nehru Gandhi (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2010).

131 Ram Chandra Guha, India after Gandhi: The History of the World's Largest Democracy (New York: Ecco, 2007), pp. 389–391.

132 Department of Atomic Energy, ‘Dr. Vikram Sarabhai: New AEC Chief’, Nuclear India, Vol. 4, No. 9 (May 1966), pp. 1–2.

133 Engermann, The Price of Aid, pp. 259–262; Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 95.

134 Frank, Indira, p. 299.

135 Amrita Shah, Vikram Sarabhai: A Life (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007); Vikram Sarabhai, ‘Science and National Goals’, in Kamla Choudhary (eds), Science Policy and National Development: Vikram Sarabhai (Delhi: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 3–10; Vikram Sarabhai, ‘Security of Developing Countries’, in Choudhary (eds), Science Policy, pp. 154–161.

136 Department of Atomic Energy, ‘Dr. Sarabhai's Press Conference–June 1, 1966’, Nuclear India, Vol. 4, No. 9 (May 1966), pp. 5–6.

137 Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, p. 122.

138 LBJPL, ‘Views of Indian Military Officials on Atomic Energy Development’, 2 August 1966, NSF (Files of Spurgeon Keeny), Box 8.

139 Chaudhuri, Arms, Aims and Aspects, p. 115.

140 L. K. Jha, ‘A Versatile Mind’, in P. K. Joshi (ed.), Vikram Sarabhai: The Man and the Vision (Ahmedabad: Manap, 1992), p. 46.

141 NMML, ‘Nuclear Security’, 2 May 1967, Prime Minister's Secretariat (PMS) (P. N. Haksar Papers, IIIrd Installment), File No. 110 (Top Secret).

142 NMML, ‘Nuclear Policy’, 3 May 1967, PMS (P. N. Haksar Papers, IIIrd Installment), File No. 110 (Top Secret).

143 Ibid.

144 Ibid.

145 Ibid.

146 Ibid.

147 Ibid.

148 Ibid.

149 NMML, ‘Letter from P. N. Haksar to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’, 7 August 1967, PMS (P. N. Haksar Papers, IIIrd Installment), File No. 114 (Secret).

150 Ibid.

151 See ‘Pokhran 1974: Interview with R. Chidambaram by C. V. Sundaram on September 24, 1996’, reproduced in Sundaram et al., Atomic Energy in India, pp. 183–212.

152 Ibid.

153 Ibid.

154 Ibid.

155 NAI, ‘Copy of the Telegram No. 151 dated 2 November 1967 from Shri V. C. Trivedi, Ambassador of India, Switzerland’, PMS, 30(36)/65 PMS (Secret).

156 NAI, ‘Untitled Note prepared by Rikhi Jaipal, Joint Secretary (UNXP), on Security Assurances from Nuclear Powers’, 11 November 1967, PMS, 30(36)/65 PMS (Secret).

157 Ibid.

158 Indian participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1968. [Notes of Conversation between D. L. Cole and Rikhi Jaipal, 24 April 1968]. At: Place: The National Archives, Kew. [[FCO 37]]/[[130]]. Available through: Adam Matthew, Marlborough, Archives Direct, http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/Documents/Details/FCO_37_130, [last accessed 15 May 2021].

159 Indian participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1968. [Indian Signature of the NPT, 10 April 1968]. At: Place: The National Archives, Kew. [[FCO 37]]/[[130]]. Available through: Adam Matthew, Marlborough, Archives Direct, http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/Documents/Details/FCO_37_130, [last accessed 15 May 2021].

160 Joshi, ‘Debating the Nuclear Legacy of India’.

161 NMML, ‘Instructions to India's Representative to UN on Non-proliferation Treaty’, 20 April 1968, PMS (P. N. Haksar Papers, I&II Installment), File. No. 35 (Top Secret).

162 B. Ramesh Babu, ‘Nuclear Proliferation and Stability in Asia’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 3, No. 36 (September 1968), pp. 1365–1368.

163 Raghavan, ‘The Fifty-Year Crisis’.

164 NMML, ‘Instructions to India's Representative to UN on Non-proliferation Treaty’, 20 April 1968, PMS (P. N. Haksar Papers, I&II Installment), File. No. 35 (Top Secret).

165 Indian participation in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 1968. [Notes of Conversation between James Morrison (British High Commissioner) and Vikram Sarabhai, 24 April 1968]. At: Place: The National Archives, Kew. [[FCO 37]]/[[130]]. Available through: Adam Matthew, Marlborough, Archives Direct, http://www.archivesdirect.amdigital.co.uk.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/Documents/Details/FCO_37_130, [last accessed 15 May 2021].

166 NAI, ‘Brief on Half an Hour Discussion by Shri Samar Guha on point arising out of reply given to unstarred question No. 596 on 25.2.1970 regarding use of nuclear engineering technology for peaceful purposes admitted for discussion in Lok Sabha on 20.4.1970 by the Department of Atomic Energy’, PMS, 56169/70-Parl (Restricted).

167 NAI, ‘Technical Background: Annexure III)’, PMS, 56169/70-Parl (Restricted).

168 NAI, ‘Brief on Government's stand on the resolution by Shri Virbhadra Singh, M.P. for discussion in the House on 17th April, 1970’, 24 April 1970, PMS, 56/69/70-Parl (Top Secret); NAI, ‘Brief for the PM for the Debate in Lok Sabha on the motion of Shri Kanwar Lal Gupta, Member, Lok Sabha on the “manufacture of an atom bomb”’, 24 April 1970, PMS, 56/69/70-Parl (Top Secret).

169 NAI, ‘Brief on Government's stand on the resolution by Shri Virbhadra Singh’.

170 Ibid.

171 Ibid.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 NAI, ‘Monthly Military Digest No. 7—July 1970’, 6 August 1970, MEA, HI-1012(57)/70 (Secret).

175 NAI, ‘Sino-Soviet Border Clashes on the River Ussuri—March 1969: Note prepared by J. S. Mehta for the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Cabinet’, 22 March 1969, MEA, PP(JS) 3 (11)/68 Vol. I (Top Secret).

176 Ibid.

177 NAI, ‘Sino-Soviet Dispute and India’, 12 October 1969, MEA, PP(JS) 3 (11)/68 Vol. I (Top Secret).

178 NAI, ‘Record of conversation between the Ambassador, L. K. Jha and Secretary of State, Roger Williams’, 12 August 1971, MEA, WII/504/3/71 (Secret).

179 NAI, ‘Sino-Indian Relations in the Context of the latest developments in Sino-US and Sino-Soviet relations’, 24 March 1970, MEA, PP(JS) 3(11) 68 Vol. II (Secret).

180 Ibid.

181 Ibid.

182 For India's effort to reach a rapprochement with China in the late 1960s, see Srinath Raghavan, 1971: A Global History of the Creation of Bangladesh (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013), pp. 193–197.

183 Ibid., p. 195.

184 Ibid., p. 196.

185 Ibid., p. 197.

186 NMML, ‘Revised Defense Plan 1974–79’, 25 December 1974, Ministry of Defense and Related Files 1971–76 (P. N. Haksar Papers, IIIrd Installment), File No. 296 (Top Secret).

187 Anil Kakodkar, Fire and Fury: Transforming India's Strategic Identity (New Delhi: Rupa, 2019), pp. 69–70; Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb, pp. 171–172.

188 D. K. Palit, ‘India as Asian Military Power’, India International Center Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 1 (January 1975), pp. 35–47. Christiane Tirimagni-Hurtig, ‘The Indo-Pakistani War and the End of Power Balance in South Asia’, The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July–September 1974), pp. 201–219.

189 Chester Bowles, ‘America and Russia in India’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 49. No. 4 (July 1971), pp. 636–651.

190 Baldev Raj Nayyar, ‘India and the United States: New Directions and their Context’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 12, No. 45/46 (5–12 November 1977), pp. 1905–1914; Ramesh Thakur, ‘India and the United States: The Triumph of Hope over Experience’, Asian Survey, Vol. 36, No. 6 (June 1996), pp. 574–591.

191 Indira Gandhi, ‘India and the World’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1972), p. 75.

192 Chengappa, Weapons of Peace; Karnad, Nuclear Weapons, and Indian Security.

193 NMML, ‘Summary of the Meeting Between General Sam Manekshaw and Marshall Grechko’, 25 February 1972, PMS (P. N. Haksar Papers, IIIrd Installment), File No. 242 (Top Secret).

194 Ibid.

195 Ibid.

196 Ibid.

197 NMML, ‘Report of the Apex Planning Group by the Cabinet Secretariat (Military Wing)’.

198 Ibid.

199 Noorani, A. G., ‘Soviet Ambitions in South Asia’, International Security, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Winter 1979/80), pp. 31–59CrossRefGoogle Scholar; A. G. Noorani, Brezhnev's Plan for Asian Security: Russia in Asia (Bombay: Jaico, 1975).

200 Balazs Szalontai, ‘The ‘Elephant in the Room: The Soviet Union and India's Nuclear Program, 1967–1987’, Working Paper No. 1, Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, November 2011, pp. 7–8.

201 William J. Brands, ‘India and America at Odds’, International Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 3 (July 1973), pp. 371–384.

202 Raja Ramanna, ‘Five Decades of Scientific Development: Memories of P. N. Haksar’, in Subrata Banerjee (ed.), Contributions in Remembrance: Homage to P. N. Haksar (Haksar Memorial Volume II) (Chandigarh: Center for Research and Industrial Development, 2004), p. 61.

203 Ibid.

204 Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, p. 106.

205 Maharaj K. Chopra, India and Indian Ocean: New Horizons (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1982), p. 136.

206 ‘Pokhran 1974: Interview with R Chidambaram by C. V. Sundaram on September 24, 1996’, in Sundaram et al., Atomic Energy in India, pp. 183–212.

207 Kampani, New Delhi's Long Nuclear Journey, pp. 71–114.

208 Ibid., pp. 80–81.

209 ‘Pokhran 1974: Interview with R. Chidambaram by C.V. Sundaram on September 24, 1996’, in Sundaram et. al, Atomic Energy in India, pp. 183–212.

210 Interview with a senior Indian diplomat, 14 September 2017, New Delhi, India.

211 For a detailed explanation, see Joshi, ‘The Imagined Arsenal’, pp. 15–30.

212 NMML, ‘Comments of the Ministry of Defense on the Note received from the Ministry of Finance, January 1975’, Ministry of Defense and Related Files 1971–76 (P. N. Haksar Papers, IIIrd Installment), File No. 296 (Top Secret).

213 Ibid.

214 Ibid.

215 Joshi, ‘The Imagined Arsenal’, pp. 28–29.

216 Ibid.

217 Subrahmanyam, ‘India's Nuclear Policy’, pp. 26–53.

218 Interview with Ambassador Shiv Shankar Menon, 19 June 2018, New Delhi, India.

219 Joshi, ‘Waiting for the Bomb’, pp. 22–30.

220 Pant and Joshi, India's Nuclear Policy, pp. 8–9.

221 Narang, ‘Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation’, pp. 143–146.

222 Kampani, ‘India's Long Nuclear Journey’, p. 91; Narang, ‘Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation’, p. 143.

223 Raghavan, 1971, p. 194.

224 Feroz Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Adrian Levy and C. Scott Clark, Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy (New Delhi: Penguin, 2007).

225 Joshi, ‘Debating the Nuclear Legacy of India’.

226 Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, ‘Solarz Meeting with Arun Singh’, 24 December 1986, John Gunther Dean Papers, Box 6, Folder 3.

227 These arguments are fully developed in Yogesh Joshi and Rohan Mukherjee, ‘The Cost of Restraint: Explaining India's Differential Response to China and Pakistan as Nuclear Threats’, Paper Presented at the India Security Workshop organized by Carnegie, India and the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 30 July 2020, Washington DC.