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Transforming Italy's institutions? The bicameral committee on institutional reform

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2016

Mark Gilbert
Mark Gilbert*
Affiliation:
Department of European Studies and Modem Languages, University of Bath, Bath A2 7AY, United Kingdom. Tel: 01225 826390, Fax: 01225 826099, E-mail: mlsmfg@bath.ac.uk
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Summary

In 1997, Italy's leading politicians began the overdue process of revising the existing constitution. The bicameral commission of parliament charged with this task has proposed significant alterations to the country's institutional structure. Innovations include a directly elected presidency, an end to bicameralism and a greater role for sub-national tiers of administration. However, this article argues that the suggested changes are in fact less sweeping than they seem, and do not address the country's urgent need to move towards a more competitive form of democracy.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , May 1998 , pp. 49 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

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References

Notes

1. There were five main academic dissidents, professors Barbera, Augusto, Cheli, Enzo, Panebianco, Angelo, Pasquino, Gianfranco and Sartori, Giovanni. In his memoir of the Bicamerale, La Grande Occasione: L'Italia verso le Riforme , Mondadori, Milan, 1997, p. 30, D'Alema says that the problem with these individuals was that they ‘measured everything by their own theoretical models’ and were unwilling to ‘pass from words to deeds’.Google Scholar

2. The terms ‘consensual democracy’ and ‘competitive democracy’ may need explanation for non-specialists in political science. Briefly, the distinction derives from the work of the Dutch political scientist, Arend Lijphart, who argued in the 1960s that the multi-party democracies of western Europe were not inferior to the two-party American or Westminister models, as political scientists in the United States had tended to suggest, but were rather rational responses to the fundamental social, ethnic, linguistic and religious cleavages found in countries such as Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Italy. Such democracies function, in Lijphart's view, according to the principle of inclusion—conscious that society might fly apart, political leaders endeavour to include all political opinions into the political process, including the nominal opposition groups. In competitive Anglo-Saxon democracies, by contrast, confidence in society's homogeneity allows politics to be more confrontational and politics is conducted according to a ‘winner takes all’ principle. Italy, however, was something of an exception (though not the only exception, as the case of Finland illustrates) to the ‘consociational’ (to use Lijphart's own term) rule. Its primary division was ideological (Communist/anti-Communist), rather than ethnic or linguistic or religious, and the task of its democracy was to prevent this cleavage of opinion (which in the cold-war climate had the concrete political consequence of excluding one of society's most important sections of opinion, the communists, from government) from turning into political strife. The result was that the necessary compromises between the parties took place in parliament, which became the (increasingly congested) heart of the country's institutions. The absence of alternation in government, however, eventually led to systemic degeneration and the formation of a political class or oligarchy whose corporate interests dominated policy-making and led to increasing and eventually intolerable levels of maladministration and corruption. There is a growing body of opinion in Italian academic circles that the collapse of international communism, and the modernization of Italy's own communist party, have provided the conditions for the abandonment of the consociational or consensual form of democracy. This is certainly the view of the professors mentioned above, and it is also the argument of an aggressively argued and very readable book by Fabbrini, Sergio, Le regole della democrazia, Laterza, Bari—Roma, 1997. Such scholars tend to regard the institutional compromise reached in the bicamerale, and described in this article, as being an immense missed opportunity to move to a competitive form of democracy. They differ among themselves, however, as to what the best institutional form to achieve this goal is—hence D'Alema's criticism. This article, as the notes make clear, has been deeply influenced by their views, particularly those of Fabbrini and Pasquino.Google Scholar

3. A brief introduction to the debate in the Constituent Assembly is to be found in Messina, Sebastiano, La Grande Riforma, Laterza, Bari, 1993, pp. 15–31.Google Scholar

4. This argument is expressed much more fully in Pasquino, Gianfranco, La Nuova Politico, Laterza, Bari, 1992, particularly in the essays ‘Gli strumenti della cittadinanza’ and ‘La filosofia politica della riforma elettorale’, pp. 87–144 passim.Google Scholar

5. The small–medium parties were assisted by means of a device known as the ‘scorporo’. For an English-language description of how the ‘scorporo’ functions, see Katz, Richard, ‘The 1993 Parliamentary Election Reform’, in Mershon, Carol and Pasquino, Gianfranco (eds), Italian Politics, Ending the First Republic, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, pp. 93–112.Google Scholar

6. The fullest account of the 1994 elections is Pasquino, Gianfranco (ed.), L'alternanza inattesa, Rubbettino, Catanzaro, 1995. Of particular interest in this context are the essays by Enrico Melchionda, pp. 131–207 and Stefano Ceccanti and Sergio Fabbrini, pp. 257–83.Google Scholar

7. Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘The Government of Lamberto Dini’, in Caciagli, Mario and Kertzer, David (eds), Italian Politics, The Stalled Transition, Westview Press, Boulder, 1996, pp. 137–52 is the best discussion of the accession of Dini to power.Google Scholar

8. For a more detailed discussion of this point the reader is referred to Fabbrini, Sergio, ‘Italy: The Decline of a Parliamentary Party Government’, in Res Publica, 38, 2 (1996), pp. 307–23.Google Scholar

9. Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘No Longer a Party State? Institutions, Power and Problems of Italian Reform’, West European Politics, 1/97, pp. 34–53, especially pp. 42–3.Google Scholar

10. Panebianco, Angelo, Il prezzo della libertà, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1995, p. 54. An interesting discussion of why professors are so important in the political life of Italy is Sergio Fabbrini, ‘La Democrazia e i professori’, MicroMega, 3/94, pp. 97–109.Google Scholar

11. See Hine, David, Governing Italy, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1993, pp. 257–81.Google Scholar

12. For a discussion of the Ulivo's constitutional proposals, see Gilbert, Mark, ‘The Oak Tree and the Olive Tree’, in Caciagli, and Kertzer, (eds), Italian Politics, The Stalled Transition, pp. 101–17.Google Scholar

13. See Pasquino, , ‘No Longer a Party State?’, especially pp. 47–8.Google Scholar

14. For a discussion of the Lega's shift towards a secessionist stance, see Diamanti, I., ‘The Lega Nord: From Federalism to Secession’, in D'Alimonte, Roberto and Nelken, David (eds), Italian Politics, The Center-left in Power, Westview, Boulder, 1997, pp. 65–81. The Lega has since fluctuated towards a preference for a ‘Scottish’ form of autonomy; by the time this article appears, it may be advocating some entirely new policy.Google Scholar

15. Article 138 of the existing constitution requires constitutional amendments to be passed twice by an absolute majority of both chambers at an interval of not less than three months. Unless a two-thirds majority has been obtained in the second reading of the amendment in both chambers, it is possible for one-fifth of the members of either chamber, or 500, 000 voters, or five regional governments, to call for a referendum on the issue. The complexity of this process mandates popular consultation for any constitutional change. Article 138 is one of the few parts of the Constitution to emerge unvaried from the Bicamerale's deliberations.Google Scholar

16. To be precise: Ida Dentamaro (CDU), Adriana Pasquali (AN), Ersilia Salvato (PRC), Claudia Mancini (Sinistra democratica), Tiziana Parenti (FI). Short biographies of all the Bicamerale's participants are available on the web page of the Italian Senate at http://www.senato.it/ Google Scholar

17. This point is vigorously made by Vassalli, Salvatore, ‘Il federalismo sedicente’, Il Mulino 4/97, pp. 694–707.Google Scholar

18. Summaries of the Bicamerale's day-by-day activities are available on the web at http://www.camera.it/ Google Scholar

19. For the ‘Bassanini laws’ see, Rugge, Fabio, ‘Le leggi Bassanini: continuità e innovazioni del riformismo amministrativo’, Il Mulino, 4/97, pp. 717–26.Google Scholar

20. See Decreto legislativo n. 281, 28 August 1997; published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, n. 202, 30 August 1997; electronic version at http://www.camera.it/ Google Scholar

21. Progetto di legge costituzionale (PLC), article 67.Google Scholar

22. PLC, article 70.Google Scholar

23. PLC, article 74, clause 6 states: ‘The prime minister will also present the resignation of the government upon the President's taking up his duties.’ Google Scholar

24. Article 74 was particularly singled out for criticism by the leading constitutionalist of the PPI, Elia, Leopoldo, in ‘Abasso il modello francese’, L'Espresso, 27 November, 1997, p. 71. The right to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, without which the presidency will become almost powerless, is one of the most fiercely contested articles in the PLC and it may yet be the cause of a bitter parliamentary struggle.Google Scholar

25. PLC, article 73. In the version approved by the bicameral committee in June 1997, the government was also supposed to ‘determine’ (as well as ‘direct’) government policy.Google Scholar

26. Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘Dal premierato forte al semipresidenzialismo debole’, Il Mulino, 4/97, p. 692. On the same point, see also Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Modello francese equivoci italiani’, Corriere della Sera, 28 May 1997 and Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘I sussulti della Bicamerale’, La Rivista dei Libri, July/August 1997. pp. 4–6.Google Scholar

27. See ‘E in terrazza spuntò il governo che verrà’, Corriere della Sera, 20 June 1997.Google Scholar

28. Sartori, Giovanni, ‘Il manifesto di chi non ci sta’, Corriere della Sera, 27 June 1997. The original Italian is ‘quei polli che siamo noi’.Google Scholar

29. PLC, article 78, ‘the number of deputies may not be less than 400 or more than 500, and is to be determined by law’.Google Scholar

30. The articles of the PLC dealing with parliamentary procedure are 91–105. The most interesting innovations come in article 95, which gives the government the power to define certain legislation as urgent, have it debated within a determined time span, and then have a version of the bill acceptable to the government voted upon clause by clause, a power that would enable it to over-ride amendments added in committee.Google Scholar

31. PLC, article 97.Google Scholar

32. PLC, article 93.Google Scholar

33. PLC, article 135. Under the revised constitution, the Constitutional Court will be composed of 20 members. Of these, five will be selected by the president, five by the legal profession itself, five by the Senate and five by a ‘college’ of the representatives of local government who will sit in the Senate when it is in special session.Google Scholar

34. Article 137 of the PLC makes it clear that ‘one-fifth of the component members of either chamber’ will be able to have recourse, under constitutional law, to the Court for judgment on the constitutionality of a law that is held to violate the ‘fundamental rights’ guaranteed by the Constitution.Google Scholar

35. Travaglio, Marco, ‘La bozza Boato tradotta in italiano’, MicroMega, 5/97, p. 52. My analysis of the justice clauses of the new constitution owes much to this excellent article, which advances the interesting thesis that the ultimate source of the proposals for altering the criminal justice system is Berlusconi's personal lawyer and close political ally, Cesare Previti. Certainly, the passages Travaglio quotes from Previti's book Un programma per la giustizia. La realizzabile Utopia di un'Italia più civile, EPR, Rome, 1996, do seem to bear out this hypothesis.Google Scholar

36. Ibid., p. 54.Google Scholar

37. Ibid., p.61.Google Scholar

38. Pasquino, , ‘Dal premierato forte al semipresidenzialismo debole’, p. 693.Google Scholar

39. Gobetti, Piero, La rivoluzione liberate, Einaudi, Turin, 1995, p. 29.Google Scholar