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The Stability Pact: Safeguarding the Credibility of the European Central Bank

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 March 2020

Michael Artis  and
Bernhard Winkler
Michael Artis
Affiliation:
European University Institute and CEPR, European University Institute
Bernhard Winkler
Affiliation:
European University Institute and CEPR, European University Institute
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Abstract

The ‘Stability Pact’ agreed at the Dublin Summit in December 1996 and concluded at the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997 prescribes sanctions for countries that breach the Maastricht deficit ceiling in stage three of European Monetary Union. This paper explores the central provisions and possible motivations of the Stability Pact as an incentive device for fiscal discipline and as a partial substitute for policy coordination and a common 'stability culture’.

Type
Articles
Information
National Institute Economic Review , Volume 163 , January 1998 , pp. 87 - 98
Copyright
Copyright © 1998 National Institute of Economic and Social Research

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Footnotes

∗

We would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a previous draft. Correspondence should be addressed to: Department of Economics, European University Institute, Badia Fiesolana, 1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (Firenze), Italy.

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