The Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic provides a unique opportunity for an examination of Soviet linguistic policy. Part of the difficulty in the analysis of the development of Soviet languages has been the lack of a control language or suitable basis for comparison between a language in its Soviet and non-Soviet environment. While it is impossible to determine how a language would have developed had there been no revolution or had it not been in the Soviet Union, some very general observations seem clear. The example of Turkish and Azerbaijani is instructive in this respect. The entire orientation of these two languages has changed drastically since their respective revolutions, particularly in the replacement of the Arabic alphabet by Latin and Cyrillic respectively, the handling of traditional arabisms and Persianisms, and the sources for neologisms (Western European languages and native roots for Turkish and Russian for Azerbaijani). There are, however, very few situations where a realistic comparison can be made between different versions of the same language, for the language abroad may represent only an emigre community or may exist in totally different circumstances, such as Iranian Azerbaijani, or the Soviet language may itself represent only a rump, such as Soviet Yiddish.

Wotic is one of the Balto-Finnic languages. In the nineteenth century, there were about 5000 speakers of this language. It was spoken between Leningrad and Estonia, in the area which is known as Ingermanland. Before the Second World War, their number was already drastically reduced (a loss of about 80–90% of the speakers). In 1939, their number was between 500 and 700. Even this small number of people who still spoke the language was spread out in a number of villages. Finnish, Estonian, Hungarian and Russian researchers who tried to note down some materials in this dying language even found dialectal differences between Eastern Wotic (spoken in the village which is called in Russian Itsepino), and Western Wotic which was spoken in several villages (for instance Korvettula, Mati, Velikino, Undova etc.)

It is very difficult to translate fully the above verse from the great Persian-speaking poet Bidil without violating its spirit in the context of the Central Asian (and other Iranian areas) culture. The spirit of the verse is not so much fatalism about life itself but is one of cynicism derived from power-lessness over one's fate. This verse is often uttered by the Central Asian intellectuals in response to questions about their relationship with the Russians and sharing of power in the Soviet bureaucracy. It does not communicate resignation. It describes the reality of the USSR, an awareness that a Central Asian is powerless to change circumstances to those favoring his/her well being and spiritual instincts. It camouflages the underlying resentment toward the dominant group, the Russians, who have the monopoly of the means of violence and who have not hesitated to use these means against the Muslim population of Central Asia on numerous occasions during the past hundred years of their rule there.

The purpose of this paper is to compare briefly the situation of national minorities in Europe before and after the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947. More particularly, to contrast the League of Nations system of minority protection with the lack of a similar system within the United Nations framework, and recent attempts to remedy this shortcoming.

The title is indicative of the outcome of the federative experiment in Eastern Europe between Ukraine and its strong neighbors Muscovy, Poland, and the Ottoman Empire. It should be pointed out at the outset that the idea of federation was adopted by the Ukrainian state not for the sake of federation but as a deterrent against strong neighbors, who despite serious setbacks continued to interfere with Ukrainian sovereignty. This was in effect the only option left to the Ukrainians considering the internal and external developments prior to and after the death of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi.

A statistical analysis of publications in the Belorussian language during the last decade reveals an ominous decline in the number of titles and imprints. This has been accompanied, however, by a parallel increase in Russian-language publications in the BSSR. These factors seem to indicate an attempt by policy-makers to homogenize the Soviet population at the expense of Belorussians, and perhaps other nationalities as well.

One of the most important sources of demographic data concerning the Soviet nationalities is the official Soviet census reports. Considering the sensitivity of the nationality problem in the USSR today, however, how thorough and dependable are the published results of the Soviet censuses regarding the more than 100 Soviet nationalities? In January 1980, a preliminary and partial report on the 1979 enumeration was issued, and until the full reports are published, probably in a year or two, it is the best source of information concerning the current numbers and distribution of the Soviet nationalities. These figures have already been and will be used for comparisons with the 1970 census reports and projections, as well as for other analyses and computations. But how reliable are these most recent statistics? Can they be taken on face value as accurate, thorough reflections of the ethnic scene in the USSR in January 1979, when the count was taken?