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Decisions of international organizations: the case of the European Union1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 July 2009

Niels Blokker
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It is a truism that there is no legislator at the global level identical to the legislator at the national level. The principle of state sovereignty is difficult to reconcile with the idea of a world legislator. This was true in previous centuries. It is still true at the beginning of the 21st century. The role of the state is predominant in the development of international law, whether it is through treaties, customary law or any other source of international law. International law is first and foremost made by states.

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Netherlands Yearbook of International Law , Volume 30 , December 1999 , pp. 3 - 44
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Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press 1999

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References

3. This is further developed in Danilenko, G.M., Law-Making in the International Community (Dordrecht, Nijhoff 1993).Google Scholar

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16. In his first report on unilateral acts of states, special rapporteur Victor Rodríguez-Cedeño proposed to the ILC to exclude unilateral acts of international organizations from the scope of his study on ‘unilateral acts of states’, and this was later supported by the ILC. At the same time, both the special rapporteur and the Commission suggest that the topic ‘unilateral acts of international organizations’ could be discussed later by the ILC. See UN Docs. A/CN.4/486 and A/CN.4/L.585.

17. See Tammes, A.J.P., ‘Decisions of International Organs as a Source of International Law’, 94 RdC (1958 II) at pp. 265–364, in particular at pp. 344Google Scholar et seq. Binding unilateral acts will be discussed in section 2.4.

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22. Resolution WHA51.10, adopted 16 May 1998. The application of non-reproductive cloning – from which medical science is expected to benefit – is not generally considered unacceptable.

23. The Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings. This Protocol was adopted 12 January 1998 following the Second Summit of the Council of Europe (10/11 October 1997) which adopted an action plan in which ‘the Heads of State and Government undertake to prohibit all use of cloning techniques aimed at creating genetically identical human beings.’

24. This was recommended in Res. 52/195, para. 6 (adopted 18 December 1997).

25. As was done in Res. 52/200, para. 8 (adopted 18 December 1997).

26. See further Schrijver, N., Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Balancing Rights and Duties in an Interdependent World (1995) at pp. 354–357Google Scholar (the references to the concepts of permissive resolutions (Röling) and of programmatory law (Dupuy) have been taken from this work).

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32. Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Rep. (1996) at pp. 254–255 (para. 70). In the case of the specific General Assembly resolutions at stake – those concerning the use of nuclear weapons – the Court came to the conclusion that several of these resolutions had been adopted ‘with substantial numbers of negative votes and abstentions; thus, although those resolutions are a clear sign of deep concern regarding the problem of nuclear weapons, they still fall short of establishing the existence of an opinio juris on the illegality of the use of such weapons’ (ibid., at 255, para. 71). Cf., also the Court's advisory opinion in the Namibia case, ICJ Rep. (1971) at p. 50 (para. 105), and the judgment of the ICJ in the Nicaragua case, ICJ Rep. (1986) at pp. 99–100. For a general analysis of the (earlier) case-law of the ICJ dealing with resolutions of international organizations Thierry, H., ‘Les résolutions des organes internationaux dans la jurisprudence de la Cour internationale de Justice’, 167 RdC (1980-II) at pp. 385–450.Google Scholar

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34. Schreuer, C., Decisions of International Institutions before Domestic Courts (London, Oceana 1981) at pp. 59–64Google Scholar; 355–356.

35. Chinkin, C., Third Parties in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon 1993) at p. 144.Google Scholar

36. As has been observed by the Court of Justice of the European Communities: ‘[…] every national court must, in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirety and protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule’ (Simmenthal, case 106/77 [1978] ECR 644; see also Ciola, case C-224/97 Judgment of 29 April 1999, not yet reported).

37. Grimaldi case C-322/88 [1989] ECR 4421. See also Deutsche Shell case C-188/91 [1993] ECR I-388.

38. Scelle, G.A.J., Manuel de Droit International Public (Paris, Domat-Montchrestien 1948) at pp. 21 et seq.Google Scholar; Scelle, G.A.J., ‘Le phénomène juridique de dédoublement fonctionnel’ in Schätzel, W. and Schlochauer, H.-J., eds., Rechtsfragen der internationalen Organisation – Festschrift für Hans Wehberg zu seinem 70. Geburtstag (Frankfurt a.M., Klostermann 1956) pp. 324–342Google Scholar. See also Cassese, A., ‘Remarks on Scelle's Theory of ‘Role Splitting’ (dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law’, 1 EJIL (1990) pp. 210–231.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

39. See also Valticos, N., ‘Les conventions de l'organisation international du travail à la croisée des anniversaires’, 100 RGDIP (1996) pp. 5–43, in particular at pp. 14–15.Google Scholar

40. Ibid, at p. 16.

41. Chart showing ratifications of conventions and agreements concluded within the Council of Europe, reproduced in 44 European Yearbook (1996) at C of E 56–58.

42. Morgenstern, F., Legal Problems of International Organizations (Cambridge, Grotius Publications 1986) at pp. 116–118.Google ScholarCf., also Wood, J., ‘International Labour Organisation Conventions – Labour Code or Treaties?’ 40 ICLQ (1991) at pp. 649–657.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

43. SC Res. 827 created the Ad Hoc Tribunal on War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia; SC Res. 955 created the Rwanda Tribunal.

44. See Kirgis in Schachter and Joyner, op. cit. n. 4, at pp. 135–137 and at pp. 825–857.

45. Ibid., at pp. 127–130 and at pp. 715–751.

46. These examples are briefly examined in Schemers and Blokker, op. cit. n. 10, at pp. 815–816. For the IMF, see its publication Selected Decisions and Selected Documents of the International Monetary Fund (21st issue, 1996).

47. The capital D is used to distinguish this instrument not only from decisions in the general sense of ‘decisions of international organizations’ as used in this article, but also from non-Art. 249 EC/EU decisions such as those mentioned below in Section 3.5.

48. E.g., measures (Art. 153.3), guidelines (Art. 155.1), general action programmes (Art. 175.3), multiannual programmes (Art. 179).

49. See below, section 3.5.

50. Zuckerfabrik Watenstedt, case 6/68 ECR [1968] p. 415.

51. Idem.

52. Commission v. United Kingdom case 128/78 [1979] ECR 428–429; Industrias Pesqueras Campos and others v. Commission, joined cases T-551/93, T-231/94, T-232/94, T-233/94, T-234/94 [1996] ECR II-280–281.

53. Lauwaars, R.H., Lawfulness and Legal Force of Community Decisions (Leiden, Sijthoff 1973) at p. 14.Google Scholar

54. Commission v. Italy, case 39/72 [1973] ECR 113–114.

55. Simmenthal, case 106/77 [1978] ECR 643.

56. Cf., Pescatore, P., Droit international et droit communautaire (Nancy, Centre Européen Universitaire 1969) at p. 15Google Scholar: ‘Dans cette mesure le traité a éliminé l'interposition, caractéristique du droit des gens, du pouvoir de l'Etat entre l'obligation contractée sur le plan international et sa répercussion dans l'ordre juridique interne.’

57. Cf., van der Meersch, W. Ganshof, ‘L'ordre juridique des communautés européennes et le droit international’, RdC (1975-V) at pp. 252–253.Google Scholar

58. Cf., Wyatt, D. and Dashwood, A., European Community Law, 3rd edn. (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1993)Google Scholar who conclude at p. 69: ‘Regulations, in short, are to be treated as “law” in every sense of the word.’

59. Lasok, D. and Bridge, J.W., An Introduction to the Law and Institutions of the European Communities, 3rd edn. (London, Butterworths 1982)Google Scholar referring to Pescatore, P., Les aspects fonctionnels de la Communauté économique européenne, Les aspects juridiques du marché commun (1958) at p. 67.Google Scholar

60. Kapteyn, P.J.G. and van Themaat, P. VerLoren, Introduction to the Law of the European Communities from Maastricht to Amsterdam edited and further revised by Gormley, L.W., 3rd edn. (London, Kluwer Law International 1998) p. 247Google Scholar; Lasok and Bridge, op. cit. n. 57, at pp. 97–98.

61. Tammes, op. cit. n. 15, at p. 359; Virally, op. cit. n. 31, at p. 177 et seq.

62. Burrows, N. & Hiram, H., ‘The Legal Articulation of Policy in the European Community’, in Daintith, T., Implementing EC Law in the United Kingdom: structures for indirect rule (Chichester, John Wiley 1995) at p. 33.Google Scholar

63. Cf., the Court's case-law in which the directive has been characterized as ‘un mode de législation ou de réglementation indirecte’. E.g., Gibraltar/Council case C-298/89 [1993] ECR I-3654. See also Timmermans, C., ‘Community Directives Revisited’, 17 YEL (1997) at p. 1.Google Scholar

64. See for example Bracke, N.E., Voorwaarden voor goede EG-wetgeving (The Hague, Sdu 1996) in particular at pp. 165–167.Google Scholar

65. Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, op. cit. n. 58, at p. 329.

66. Cf., the interinstitutional agreement concluded on 22 December 1998 between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, on common guidelines for the quality of drafting of Community legislation, published in OJ 1999, C 73/1. General principle 2 provides that ‘The drafting of Community acts shall be appropriate to the type of act concerned and, in particular, to whether or not it is binding.’

67. Commission v. Belgium, case C-167/90 [1991] ECR I-2535. A more recent example is Commission v. Belgium, case C-347/97 [1999] ECR I-309.

68. E.g., Commission v. Belgium, case C-42/89 [1990] ECR I-2841.

69. Cf., the less elaborate Art. 27, first sentence, of the 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties: ‘A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’.

70. Commission v. Italy, case 136/81 [1982] ECR 3552.

71. See e.g., Ninth Council Directive of 26 June 1978 on the harmonization of the laws of the member states relating to turnover taxes (78/583/EEC), OJ 1978, L 194/16. The lawfulness of such extensions is confirmed by the EC Court, see Commission v. Italy, case 52/75 [1976] ECR 284. Sometimes the possibility of extending the deadline for implementation is explicitly mentioned in the directive, see e.g. First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the member states relating to trade marks (89/104/EEC) OJ 1989, L 40/1 (Art. 16.2).

72. ILO Constitution, Arts 19.5(b) and 19.6(b).

73. Art. 22. See Vierheilig, M., Die rechtliche Einordnung der von der Weltgesundheits-organisation beschlossenen regulations (Heidelberg, R. v. Decker 1984).Google Scholar

74. Schermers and Blokker, op. cit. n. 10, at pp. 794–797.

75. See e.g., Commission v. Belgium, case C-207/97 [1999] ECR I-275.

76. Royer, case 48/75 [1976] ECR 519.

77. Von Colson and Kamann, case 14/83 [1984] ECR 1906; Commission v. Italy, case C-336/97 Judgment of 17 June 1999, not yet reported, para. 19.

78. Commission v. Italy, case C-95/92 [1993] ECR I-3119; Commission v. Greece, case C-311/95 [1996] ECR I-2433.

79. E.g., Commission v. Germany, case C-58/89 [1991] ECR I-4983.

80. E.g., Commission v. Netherlands, case 96/81 [1982] ECR 1804; Commission v. France, case C-225/97 Judgment of 19 May 1999, not yet reported.

81. E.g., Commission v. Germany, case C-131/88 [1991] ECR I-825; Commission v. Germany, case C-58/89 [1991] ECR I-5023.

82. See Grad, case 9/70 [1970] ECR 825; Lesage, case 20/70 [1970] ECR 861; Haselhorst, case 23/70 [1970] ECR 881; Van Duyn, case 41/74 [1974] ECR 1337.

83. Commission v. Belgium, case 102/97 [1980] ECR 1487; more recently Commision v. Germany, case C-253/95 [1996] ECR I-2430. See also Emmott, case C-208/90 [1991] ECR I-4298: ‘[S]o long as a directive has not been properly transposed into national law, individuals are unable to ascertain the full extent of their rights.’

84. See e.g., Comitato di coordinamento per la difesa della cava and others ECR, case C-236/92, [1994] at I-502; more recently HI Krankenhaustechnik, case C-258/97 judgment of 4 March 1999, not yet reported.

85. Faccini Dori, case C-91/92 [1994] ECR I-3355.

86. VNO, case 51/76 [1977] ECR 127 and ENKA, case 38/77 [1977] ECR 2203. According to Prechal, S., Directives in European Community Law (Oxford, Clarendon 1995) pp. 275–276Google Scholar, they ‘have remained perhaps somewhat isolated on the Community level.’ In 1996, new life was breathed into this almost forgotten case-law: Kraaijeveld, case C-72/95 [1996] ECR I-5403.

87. Von Colson and Kamann, case 14/83 [1984] ECR 1891, and Harz, case 79/83 [1984] ECR 1942. This device has been mentioned in a large number of cases. A more recent example is Società Italiana Petroli SpA, case C-2/97 [1998] ECR I-8597. See further Prechal, op. cit. n. 84, at pp. 200–245; Brechmann, W., Die richtlinienkonforme Auslegung (Zugleich ein Beitrag zur Dogmatik der EG-Richtlinie) (Berlin, Beck 1994).Google Scholar

88. Francovich, cases C-6 and 9/90 [1991] ECR I-5357. See further Brasserie du Pêcheur, cases C-46 and 48/93 [1996] ECR I-1029. For a recent case, see the Court's judgment of 25 February 1999 in Carbonari, case C-131/97 not yet reported. See Prechal, op. cit. n. 86, at pp. 306–345; Heukels, T. and McDonnell, A., eds., The Action for Damages in Community Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1997)Google Scholar with references to further literature.

89. Art. 230 EC.

90. See for analyses of the Court's case-law on this point Schermers, H.G. and Waelbroeck, D., Judicial Protection in the European Communities, 5th edn. (Deventer, Kluwer 1992) at pp. 158–164Google Scholar; Lenaerts, K. and Arts, D., Procedural Law of the European Union (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1999)Google Scholar; Greaves, R., ‘The Nature and Binding Effect of Decisions under Article 189 EC’, 21 ELRev. (1996) pp. 3–16.Google Scholar

91. Grad, case 9/70 [1970] ECR 825. More recently Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt, case C-156/91 [1992] ECR I-5595.

92. For example, Arts. 76, 85.2, 104.6.

93. Kapteyn and VerLoren van Themaat, op. cit. n. 60, at p. 332.

94. Idem.

95. See for example Commission Recommendation 96/290/EC of 17 April 1996 concerning a coordinated programme for the official control of foodstuffs for 1996, OJ 1996, L 109/24.

96. OJ 1993, L 340/41.

97. OJ 1998, C 344/1.

98. OJ 1999, C 73/1.

99. OJ 1999, C 125/1.

100. OJ 1999, C 201/1.

101. OJ 1999, C 203/1.

102. Snyder, F., Soft Law and Institutional Practice in the European Community, in Martin, S., ed., The Construction of Europe – Essays in Honour of Emile Noël (Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994) at pp. 197–225, 199–200.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

103. Such acts are therefore usually published in the L series of the Official Journal. See Lenaerts, K. et al. , Constitutional Law of the European Union (London, Sweet & Maxwell 1999) at p. 587.Google Scholar

104. E.g., Council Decision 1999/803/EC of 23 November 1999 accepting the extension of the International Coffee Agreement on behalf of the Community, OJ 1999, L 313/8.

105. E.g., Council Decision 1999/C 373/03 of 13 December 1999 appointing a member of the Advisory Committee on Nursing Training, OJ 1999, C 373/3.

106. E.g., Council Decision 1999/847/EC of 9 December 1999 establishing a Community action programme in the field of civil protection, OJ 1999, L 327/53.

107. See Melchior, M., ‘Les communications de la Commissions: Contribution à l'étude des actes communautaires non prévus par les traités’, Mélanges Fernand Dehousse (Vol. 2) – La Construction européenne (1979) pp. 243–258.Google Scholar

108. See for example Schlüter, case 9/73 [1973] ECR 1161–1162; The Netherlands v. Council, case C-58/94 [1996] ECR I-2169.

109. Wessel, R.A., The European Union's Foreign and Security Policy – A Legal Institutional Perspective (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1999) at p. 154Google Scholar (n. 13): the Dutch government originally took the view that this was not legislation but political positions only. However a 1995 Dutch position paper ‘refers to Joint Actions as ‘explicitly binding’ and compares them with Community Regulations and Directives’.

110. Idem, at pp. 185–189.

111. Idem, at pp. 162–169.

112. Idem, at p. 169.

113. Idem, at pp. 175–182.

114. Idem, at p. 202.

115. Responding to the criticism that the scope and function of these instruments was not clear and would need clarification, as was mentioned in the 1995 Report of the Council on the functioning of the Treaty on European Union (at p. 30, para. 61). See also the 1995 Commission Report for the Reflection Group, at pp. 63–64.

116. The Dublin Convention (OJ 1997, C 254/1) that was in fact signed in 1990 and therefore is not a Third Pillar convention, and the 1995 Europol Convention (OJ 1995, C 316/1). I thank Ms. Evelien Brouwer of Forum (Institute for Multicultural Developments) for sending me this information.

117. See e.g., the proposals made by Spain, Europe No. 6878 (19 December 1996) at p. 10.

118. Under the Maastricht Treaty, the Council had the power to provide otherwise (and e.g., prescribe unanimity for the adoption of such implementing measures).

119. Borrás, A., ‘Justice and Home Affairs: Judicial Cooperation in Civil Matters’, in Winter, J.A., eds., Reforming the Treaty on European Union – The Legal Debate (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1996) pp. 447–456, at pp. 452–453Google Scholar. See also the contribution by Fernhout, R. (‘Justice and Home Affairs: Immigration and Asylum Policy’) to this work, at p. 390.Google Scholar

120. Curtin and Pouw, op. cit. n. 14, at p. 601.

121. 1995 Report of the Council, op. cit. n. 115, at p. 37. See also the 1995 Commission Report, op. cit. n. 115, at pp. 51–52.

122. Müller-Graff, P.-C., ‘The legal bases of the third pillar and its position in the framework of the Union Treaty’, 31 CMLRev. (1994) at pp. 493–510Google Scholar (no binding force); O'Keeffe, D., ‘Recasting the Third Pillar’, 32 CMLRev. (1995) at pp. 893–920 (legally binding).Google Scholar

123. There is no change in the nature of this instrument despite the small change in name (common position instead of joint position). In other languages the name has remained unchanged.

124. This is not explicitly mentioned in the Amsterdam Treaty but can be inferred from the binding nature of the other three legal instrument of the Third Pillar and from past practice: no binding joint positions have been adopted under the Maastricht Treaty. See Bijl. Hand II 1997–1998 – 25922 (R 1613) No. 3, p. 28, and No. 5, p. 46.

125. As was indicated by the Dutch government when the Amsterdam Treaty was submitted to Parliament for approval. See Bijl. Hand. II 1997–1998 – 25922 (R 1613) No. 5, p. 50.

126. The Dutch government has mentioned as examples of decisions: a decision to appoint a director of Europol or to determine the internal workprogramme of the Council for a particular period. In addition, it has listed 33 joint actions adopted on the basis of Art. K.3 of the Maastricht Treaty and concluded that four of these are of a (partial) normative character and would under the Amsterdam Treaty provisions have the form of a framework decision. See Hand. II 1997–1998 – 25922 (R 1613), No. 5, pp. 46–50, and No. 3, p. 28.

127. While in English they are both named decision, in German and Dutch they carry different names: Entscheidung and beschikking for Art. 249 decisions, Beschluβ and besluit for Art. 34.2(c) decisions.

128. See also Usher, J.A., ‘Flexibility and Enhanced Cooperation’, in Heukels, T., eds., The European Union after Amsterdam: legal Analysis (1998) pp. 253–271 (The Hague, Kluwer Law International 1998) at p. 270.Google Scholar

129. Cf., de Witte, B., ‘The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?’Google Scholar, in Heukels, et al., op. cit. n. 128, at pp. 51–68, in particular at pp. 55–56: ‘It is out of a better understanding of their own long-term national interest that the member states have now ‘infected’ the two intergovernmental pillars with an extra dose of méthode communautaire and have thus recognized that successful and effective cooperation between states is sometimes better served by the severe regime of institutional constraints and limitations of sovereignty practiced within the European Community than by the lax entre nous of the second and third pillars.’

130. See Dehousse, F., ‘After Amsterdam: A Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union’, 9 EJIL (1998) pp. 525–539, at p. 533.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

131. 20 ILM (1981) p. 672 (1981). The original name of the organization is Asociación Latino-americana de Integración (ALADI). Website: www.aladi.org.

132. Montevideo Treaty, Arts. 7–9.

133. On the Andean Community, see Reinoso, A. Fairlie, ‘The Andean Community Case’, in Demaret, P. et al. , Regionalism and Multilateralism after the Uruguay Round (Brussels, European Interuniversity Press 1997) at pp. 177–197.Google Scholar

134. Cartagena Agreement (originally concluded in 1969), as codified by the 1997 Protocol of Trujillo, Art. 1.

135. Cartagena Agreement, as codified by the 1997 Protocol of Trujillo, Preamble. See www.comunidadandina.org.

136. The Court is composed of five judges and has functions similar to those of the EC Court. Website: www.altesa.net/tribunal.

137. The Cartagena Agreement provides for direct elections for the members of the Andean Parliament in the near future (Art. 42). Website: www.parlamentoandino.org.

138. Cartagena Agreement, Art. 17.

139. Cartagena Agreement, Art. 21.

140. Cartagena Agreement, Art. 29.

141. As amended by the Protocol of Cochobamba concluded in 1996 (entered into force in 1999).

142. See Marwege, R. and Samtleben, J., ‘Wirtschaftliche Integration und gewerbliche Schutzrechte in der Rechtsprechung des Andengerichtshofs’, GRUR Int. (1993) pp. 279–291.Google Scholar

143. On Mercosur, see Peña, F., ‘Some Lessons from the Mercosur Initial Experience’Google Scholar, in Demaret, et al., op. cit., n. 133, at pp. 161–175; Kleinheisterkamp, J., ‘Legal Certainty in the Mercosur: The Uniform Interpretation of Community Law’Google Scholar, published in the Fall 1999 issue of NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the America. I am indebted to Ms. Angelica Avila-Castañeda for giving me documents and further information concerning Mercosur.

144. 30 ILM (1991) p. 1994.

145. 36 ILM (1997) p. 691.

146. 34 ILM (1995) p. 1244.

147. The main rules for dispute settlement can be found in the aforementioned Protocol of Brasilia. According to this Protocol, members shall first attempt to settle disputes through direct negotiations. If there is no agreement, the Common Market Group may intervene. If such intervention is not successful, parties may take recourse to arbitration. The first arbitration report was delivered on 28 April 1999 and refers not only to a number of characteristics of the Mercosur legal order, but also to some studies of the EC legal order, in particular to Lecourt's, R.L'Europe des Juges (Bruxelles, Bruylant 1976)Google Scholar. See on this report Ventura, D., ‘First Arbitration Award in Mercosul – A Community Law in Evolution?’, 13 LJIL (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar nyp. A second arbitration report was delivered on 27 September 1999.

148. See Akintan, S., The Law of International Economic Institutions in Africa (Leiden, Sijthoff 1977)Google Scholar; Mazzeo, D., ed., African Regional Organizations (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1984)Google Scholar; Gonidec, P.-F., Les organisations Internationales africaines: étude comparative (Paris, L'Harmattan 1988)Google Scholar; Pennetta, P., Le organizzazioni internazionali dei paesi in via di sviluppo, Volume prima: Le organizzazioni economiche regionali africane (Bari, Cacucci 1998).Google Scholar

149. Peña, op. cit. n. 143, at p. 161.

150. 30 ILM (1991) p. 1241.

151. Treaty establishing the African Economic Community, Art. 6.1.

152. See further Mulat, T., ‘Multilateralism and Africa's Regional Economic Communities’, 32 JWT (1998) pp. 115–138.Google Scholar

153. The constitution of SADC is reproduced in 32 ILM (1993) p. 116Google Scholar. See also the introductory note by R.H. Thomas, for a brief analysis of developments explaining the replacement of SADCC by SADC, as well as SADC's website www.sadc-online.com. I am grateful to my colleague Dr. Elsbeth de Vos for giving me documents and further information concerning SADC.

154. 33 ILM (1994) p. 1067Google Scholar. See also Comesa's website: www.comesa.int.

155. As is explicitly mentioned on the Comesa's website: ‘The Comesa Court of Justice is modelled along the lines of the European Court of Justice’.

156. Comesa Treaty, Art. 26.

157. Comesa Treaty, Art. 30.

158. Comesa Treaty, Art. 32.

159. Cf., Friedmann, W., The Changing Structure of International Law (London, Stevens 1964) pp. 113–114.Google Scholar