Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 July 2009
Since the failure of the 1958 and 1960 Conferences on the Law of the Sea to provide for universally agreed outer limits of the territorial sea, international law has been faced with numerous claims on a seaward extension of coastal State jurisdiction. Such national claims have taken two different forms, either by making the claimed area part of the State territory, or by merely asserting certain exclusive rights and regulatory powers in given marine zones. The scope and content of such zonal claims vary considerably, according to the particular objective pursued. This development reached its peak between 1976 and 1979. In this four year period, 60 claims were made regarding territorial seas and 59 claims were made to establish exclusive economic zones. That phenomenon is, at least partly, the consequence of the negotiations of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. In May 1975, following the second substantive session, the Conference produced its first negotiating text. It reflected a general consensus on, inter alia, a 12 mile extension of the territorial sea and the acceptance, in principle, of a 200 mile exclusive economic zone. Meanwhile the Convention on the Law of the Sea (CLOS) has been signed by 157 States and ratified by 31. Such a large number of States giving their assent to the Convention leads to the question of how far national claims to archipelagic waters, extended territorial seas, exclusive economic zones or extended continental shelf areas, are compatible with the Convention on the Law of the Sea. The message provided by such an analysis of State practice will be twofold. It firstly indicates whether the Convention on the Law of the Sea was successful in putting an end to the permanent extension of coastal State jurisdiction experienced in the past and whether it thus contributed to the reduction of potential conflicts concerning the distribution of the resources of the sea. In this respect the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and its result, the Convention on the Law of the Sea, have to be subject to an appraisal against the background of Article 13 paragraph 1(a) UN Charter, according to which it is one of the functions of the General Assembly to promote and encourage the progressive development of international law as a means of maintaining international peace and security.
1. Informal Single Negotiating Text, UN Doc. A/Conf.62/WP.8 Part I. As to the negotiating process, see Koh, T.T.B. and Jayakumar, S., ‘Negotiating Process of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’, in Nordquist, M., ed., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, A Commentary (1985) p. 29 et seq.Google Scholar
2. Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 4 (February 1985) p. 2 et seq.Google Scholar
3. Up to 31 August 1986, Ocean Policy News (September 1986).
4. In his statements T.T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea from March 1981 until its conclusion on 6 and 11 December 1982 emphasized that the ‘Convention will promote the maintenance of international peace and security because it will replace a plethora of conflicting claims by coastal States with universally agreed limits on the territorial sea, on the contiguous zone, on the exclusive economic zone and on the continental shelf’ (see ‘A Constitution for the Oceans’, in M. Nordquist, ed., op.cit. n. 1, p. 11).
5. See Zuleta, B., United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1983) p. XIX et seq.Google Scholar; as to the principle of progressive development of international law, see Yuen-Li, Liang, ‘The General Assembly and the Progressive Development and Codification of International Law’, 42 AJIL (1948) pp. 66–97.Google Scholar
6. The texts of respective national legislations are provided in Smith, R.W., ed., Exclusive Economic Zone Claims: An Analysis and Primary Documents (1986)Google Scholar and in The Law of the Sea, National Legislation on the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Economic Zone and the Exclusive Fishery Zone (a report by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Law of the Sea) (1986) and unless otherwise stated all legislations referred to in this article may be found in these publications. A first study which compared and evaluated national exclusive economic zone claims has been carried out by Juda, L., ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone: Compatibility of National Claims and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 16 ODILA (1986) pp. 1–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For earlier studies of national offshore claims focusing on navigation rights, see Burke, W.T., ‘National Legislation on Ocean Authority Zones and the Contemporary Law of the Sea’, 9 ODILA (1981) pp. 289–322CrossRefGoogle Scholar and, by the same author, ‘Exclusive Fisheries Zones and Freedom of Navigation’, 20 San Diego Law Review (1983) pp. 595–623.Google Scholar
7. Law No. 82–005 relating to the delimitation of the marine zones of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros, 6 May 1982, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 103.
8. Marine Spaces Act 1977, Act No. 18 of December 1977 as amended by the Marine Spaces (Amendment) Act 1978, Act No. 15 of 6 October 1978, Marine Spaces (Archipelagic Baselines and Exclusive Economic Zone) Order 1981, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 85.
9. Marine Zones (Declaration) Act 1983, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 245.
10. Maritime Areas Act 1983, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 399.
11. Delimitation of Marine Waters Act, Act No. 32, 14 August 1979, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 413.
12. Marine Zones (Declaration) Ordinance 1983, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 459.
13. Maritime Zones Act No. 23 of 1981, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 471.
14. Constitution, ST/LEG/SER.B/18 p. 30.
15. Government Act No. 4, UN Doc. 19/5/Add.1 (1960).
16. Decree No. 156, 24 April 1963 as revised by Decree No. 128, 1 April 1976 and Decree No. 598, 1 January 1977 cited in the publication of the United States Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Smith, R.W., ed., Limits in the Sea, National Claims to Maritime Jurisdictions, 5th edn. (1985) p. 48.Google Scholar
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18. ICJ Rep. 1951 p. 116 et seq.
19. ICJ Rep. 1951 p. 133.
20. For further details see O'Connell, op.cit. n. 17, p. 244 et seq.; Sturies, R., Archipelgewässer (1981) p. 50 et seq.Google Scholar
21. Arts. 2 para. 1 and 46 to 54.
22. S. 9 para. 3, Delimitation of Marine Waters Act 1978 of the Solomon Islands only refers to the ‘customary rules of international law’.
23. S. 9 para. 1, Marine Zones (Declaration) Act 1983, of Kiribati, and s. 11 para. 1, Marine Zones (Declaration) Act 1983, of Tuvalu, even speak of ‘free’ instead of ‘innocent’ passage.
24. For example, the right of sea-lane passage has been defined by s. 9 para. 3 of the Marine Zones (Declaration) Act 1983, of Kiribati, as ‘the right of navigation and overflight in their normal modes, for the purpose of continuous, expeditious and unobstructed transit through and over the archipelagic waters and the adjacent territorial seas, from one part of the exclusive zone to another part of it.’ The respective regulations of Fiji, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu are identical.
25. For example, s. 10 para. 4, Marine Spaces Act 1977, of Fiji, states that ‘until such time as sealanes or air routes are designated … the rights of navigation and overflight … may be exercised through and over all routes normally used for international navigation and overflight’. The respective regulations of Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu are identical.
26. UN Doc. A/2934, 1955, 52–3. It was followed by a note verbale of 20 January 1956 (ILC Yearbook 1956 vol. II p. 69) making observations on the drafts of the ILC on the Law of the Sea and advocating special regulations concerning archipelagic States. As to the negotiations in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, see Oxman, B.H., ‘The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1977 New York Session’, 72 AJIL (1978) pp. 57–83 at 65 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
27. Loc.cit. n.2, p. 20.
28. For details, see O'Connell, D.P., ‘Mid-Ocean Archipelagos in International Law’, 45 BYIL (1971) p. 41.Google Scholar
29. These figures are taken from Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 7.
29a. See the summary table of limits of sovereignty and national jurisdiction in Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 8 (November 1986) p. 15.Google Scholar
30. Law of the Sea Bulletin, no.5, (July 1985) pp. 30, 31.Google Scholar
31. Used in this way by the Byelorussian Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and the USSR when opposing the declaration made by the Philippines.
32. Pohl, R.G., ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone in the Light of Negotiations of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea’, Vicuña, F.O., ed., The Exclusive Economic Zone: A Latin American Perspective (1984) pp. 31–59 at p. 56Google Scholar. Art. 310 has been used in this way by Chile in its declaration upon signing the Convention on the Law of the Sea, loc.cit. n.30, p. 9.
33. Juda, loc.cit. n. 6, p. 15.
33a. ‘Convenio Sobre Delimitation de Areas Marinas y Submarinas Entre las Republicad del Ecuador y de Costa Rica’. The assertion of a 200 mile territorial sea has been expressed unilaterally by the Proclamation by Ecuador of 19 September 1985, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 7 (April 1986) pp. 109, 110.Google Scholar
34. Albania (15 miles), Angola (20), Mauritania (70), Nigeria (30), Syria (35), Tanzania (50), Togo (30).
35. A 130 mile territorial sea implemented in 1964 was increased in 1965 to 200 miles, but this was then reduced to 12 miles in 1980.
36. Guinea Bissau reduced its claim to a 150 mile territorial sea in 1978.
37. Madagascar had claimed a 50 mile territorial sea in 1973 which was reduced to 12 miles in 1985.
38. Senegal's claim to a 150 mile territorial sea (1976) was reduced in 1985.
39. Cape Verde reduced its claim to a 100 mile territorial sea in 1977.
40. Decree Law No. 126/77 of 31 December 1977, in Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 95.
41. Ordinance 16 September 1985, in Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 254.
42. Belgium, however, declared upon ratification that the 12 mile limit as established by Art. 3 of the Convention ‘confirms and codifies a widely observed customary practice which is incumbent on every State to respect …’ (loc.cit. n.30, p. 38).
43. ICJ Rep. 1951 p. 116 et seq.
44. O'Connell, op.cit. n. 17, p. 199 et seq., shows that the matter is traceable to a much earlier date. For an analysis of the regulations of the Convention on the Law of the Sea, see Alexander, L.M., ‘Baseline Delimitations and Maritime Boundaries’, 23 VJIL (1983) pp. 503–536.Google Scholar
45. These criteria are identical with those already established by Art. 4 of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in accordance with the reasoning of the ICJ in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case. Two additional provisions appear in the Convention on the Law of the Sea Art. 7 paras. 2 and 4. The former reflects the interests of deltaic countries such as Bangladesh, the latter (prohibition on the use of low water elevations as basepoints except when recognized) refers to the Norwegian straight baseline system that has used low water elevations as basepoints since 1935.
46. O'Connell, op.cit. n. 17, p. 215 et seq., with further references, less pessimistic by Alexander, loc.cit. n. 44, p. 517 et seq.
47. Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Barbados, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Colombia, the Comoros, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Federal Republic of Germany, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Kiribati, Madagascar, Mauritania, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Portugal, St. Lucia, the Seychelles, the Solomon Islands, Sweden, Tonga, Tuvalu, the USSR, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu, and the Yemen; the respective texts of these national legislations are reprinted in Smith, op.cit. n. 6.
48. The Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Poland, Suriname, and the USA, in Smith, op.cit. n.6.
49. A geographical indepth analysis of recent State practice on baselines still needs to be undertaken. According to Alexander, loc.cit. n. 44, p. 518 et seq., the straight baselines established by Mexico (Gulf of California), Ecuador, Senegal, and Cuba have no foundation in the Convention on the Law of the Sea due to the geographical configuration of the relevant coast. Furthermore he criticizes the straight baselines established by the Philippines, Ecuador, Madagascar, and Vietnam on account of their lengths; see recently Scovazzi, T., La Linea di Base del Mare Territoriale (1986).Google Scholar
50. The Canada Gazette (2 October 1985) vol. 119, no. 20 p. 3996 et seqGoogle Scholar. As to the Canadian claims and its legal justification see Pharand, D., ‘The Legal Régime of the Arctic, Some Outstanding Issues’, 39 International Journal (1984) pp. 742–799 at p. 757 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar, and Beauchamp, K., International Legal Issues in Arctic Waters, Ocean Policy and Management in the Arctic (1984) pp. 53–79.Google Scholar
50a. Ordinance of 15 January 1985, Nautical Information of the USSR, No. 24/84, Administration on Navigation and Oceanography of the Ministry of Defence of the USSR, Moscow, nos. 57, 58, 156, 157.
51. Territorial Waters Act 1982, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 61.
52. Act No. 15/1984 of 12 November 1984 on the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 125.
53. Maritime Areas Act 1984, Smith op.cit. n. 6, p. 385.
54. Decree No. 85/185, 6 February 1985 (Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 6 (October 1985) p. 14Google Scholar).
55. Law 52/AN/78, concerning the Territorial Sea, the Contiguous Zone, the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Maritime Frontiers and Fishing, 9 January 1979, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 111.
56. Declarations, Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 123.
57. Declaration to the Convention on the Law of the Sea made by the Yemen, loc.cit. n.30, p. 40.
58. Ibid., p. 39.
59. Cape Verde, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Romania, Sao Tomé and Principé also made declarations to this extents (ibid., pp. 39 and 40); Yugoslavia declared upon ratification that the coastal State may, by its laws and regulations, subject the passage of warships to the requirement of previous notification and limit the numbers of ships simultaneously passing, on the basis of international customary law (loc.cit. n. 29a, p. 8); to the situation of Sweden, see Ordinance concerning the admission to Swedish Territory of Foreign State Vessels and State Aircraft, 1982: 755 in Smith, op.cit. n.6.
60. A detailed analysis of the development of the exclusive economic zone concept is given by Hollick, A., ‘The Origins of 200 Mile Offshore Zones’, 71 AJIL (1977) pp. 494–500Google Scholar; Gündling, L., Die 200 Seemeilen-Wirtschaftszone (1983) p. 31 et seq.Google Scholar; Amador, F.V. Garcia, ‘The Contribution to the Development of the Law of the Sea’, 68 AJIL (1974) pp. 33–50.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
61. See, for further details, Stevenson, J.R. and Oxman, B.H., ‘The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; The 1975 Geneva Session’, 69 AJIL (1975) pp. 763–797CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oxman, B.H., ‘The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea; The 1976 New York Sessions’, 71 AJIL (1977) pp. 247–269CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Oxman, loc.cit. n. 26, p. 68 et seq.
62. Figures according to Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 25 et seq.
63. The ‘sui generis’ character of the exclusive economic zone was underscored in declarations made by Cape Verde, Chile, and Uruguay upon signing the Convention (loc.cit. n.30 p. 43–44). In the same declaration Uruguay, however, emphasized that the provisions of the Convention concerning the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone were compatible with the main purposes and principles underlying Uruguayan legislation in respect of Uruguay's sovereignty and jurisdiction over the sea adjacent to its coast and over its bed and subsoil up to a limit of 200 miles. The interpretation of this statement provokes the question of whether Uruguay asserts sovereignty to the territorial sea and jurisdiction with respect to the exclusive economic zone or whether it claims sovereignty over the sea adjacent to its coast up to a limit of 200 miles (in the latter sense, see Juda, loc.cit. n. 6, p. 13). If read with the latter meaning the following parts of the declarations would make no sense thus, according to the rules on interpretation laid down in Art. 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the former interpretation is mandatory.
64. For example, Antigua and Barbuda, Burma, Dominica, and Egypt explicitly refer to Parts V and VI of the Convention. Equatorial Guinea, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Mauritania, Mauritius, St. Lucia, USSR, and Vanuatu in their legislations quite often use the term ‘exclusive right’ instead of ‘jurisdiction’.
65. Cf. Juda, loc.cit. n. 6, p. 12. However, Haiti does not assert sovereignty over the exclusive economic zone, Art. 5 of Decree No. 38, 8 April 1977 (reproduced in Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 201) but instead refers to ‘sovereign rights’ and ‘exclusive rights of jurisdiction’.
66. Antigua and Barbuda, Burma, the Comoros, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Kiribati, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tomé and Principe, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, USSR, USA, Venezuela, Vietnam, Western Samoa, and the Yemen.
67. Barbados, Cambodia, Grenada, the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles, and the Solomon Islands.
68. Burke, W.T., ‘1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea Provisions on Conditions of Access to Fisheries Subject to National Jurisdiction’, FAO, Report of the Expert Consultation on the Conditions of Access to the Fish Resources of the Exclusive Economic Zone, FAO Fisheries Report No. 293 p. 32 et seq.Google Scholar; Caflisch, L., ‘The Fishing Rights of Land-Locked and Geographically Disadvantaged States in the Exclusive Economic Zone’, Conforti, B., ed., La Zone Economica Exclusiva (1983) p. 31 et seq.Google Scholar
69. Cape Verde, the Comoros, the Cook Islands, Cuba, Fiji, the Ivory Coast, New Zealand, Spain, Togo, Tonga, and the United States.
70. The Cook Islands, Fiji, the Ivory Coast, New Zealand, Spain, Togo, and the United States.
71. For details see Tsamenyi, B.M., ‘The Jeanette Diana Dispute’, 16 ODILA (1986) pp. 353–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
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73. See Art. 64 para. 2; as to the interpretation of this clause see Wolfrum, loc.cit. n. 72, p. 698.
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75. In at least four cases (the Cook Islands, Fiji, New Zealand, and Western Samoa) municipal law specifically provides for the national management of highly migratory species within the exclusive economic zone.
76. For details on the negotiating process, see Gündling, op.cit. n. 60, p. 219 et seq.
77. Emphasis added.
78. Ss. 8, 11, 23, 54 Norwegian Law No. 11 (Petroleum Act) 22 March 1985 and ss. 38, 39 of the Royal Decree, 28 June 1985.
79. 4 Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law (1986) p. 51.Google Scholar
80. Art. 246 Convention on the Law of the Sea. Concerning marine scientific research, see Soons, A.H.A., Marine Scientific Research and the Law of the Sea (1982)Google Scholar; Jacobsen, J.L., ‘Marine Scientific Research under Emerging Ocean Law’, 9 ODILA (1981) pp. 187–199CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mangone, G.J., ‘The Effect of Extended Coastal State Jurisdiction over the Seas and Seabed upon Marine Scientific Research’, 9 ODILA (1981) pp. 201–218.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
81. According to Art. 19 Decree No. 52/85 of Portugal, such research activities may be permitted — ‘Os pedidos de autorizacao para a realizacao das actividades referidas no artigo anterior só poderao ser considerados’ — if carried out exclusively for peaceful purposes, and have no negative impact upon the economic utilization of the sea or upon the marine environment. Such a provision has no foundation in Art. 246 CLOS.
82. Mexican Federal Act Relating to the Sea, 8 January 1986, in Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 193.
83. Decree 504–494, 24 ITA 11 March 1986.
84. For an analysis of Art. 58 of the Convention, see Richardson, E., ‘Power Mobility and the Law of the Sea’, 58 Foreign Affairs (1980) pp. 902–919 at p. 916CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gündling, op.cit. n. 6, p. 275 et seq.; Extavour, W.C., The Exclusive Economic Zone, A Study of the Evolution and Progressive Development of International Law at Sea (1979) p. 237 et seq.Google Scholar
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86. For example, the Exclusive Economic Zone Bill 1984, of Malaysia, provides for the stopping, boarding, and searching of ships upon arrest. Some of these States are listed by Juda, op.cit. n. 6, p. 34; see also Okere, B.O., ‘Nigeria's Exclusive Economic Zone and Freedom of Navigation’ 13 ODILA (1984) pp. 535–538CrossRefGoogle Scholar and the response of Burke, W.T., ‘Response to Dr. Okere’, 13 ODILA (1984) pp. 539–541.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
87. Guyana, Mauritius, Nigeria, India, Pakistan, and the Seychelles, although the national legislations of the three latter States explicitly recognize the freedom of navigation and overflight.
88. Juda, loc.cit. n. 6, p. 33 et seq.
89. Barbados, Djibouti, Grenada, the Maldives, and Mauritania. Further, the Maldives requires permission for the entry of foreign fishing vessels into its economic zone. Such claim, based on the desire to protect national rights to the living resources within the economic zone, has no basis in the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
90. Antigua and Barbuda (navigation only), the Comoros, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, the Ivory Coast, Kiribati, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, the Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, St. Lucia, Sao Tomé and Principe, the Solomon Islands, Spain, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu, the United Arab Emirates, the USA, the USSR, Venezuela, and the Yemen. The USSR in its exclusive economic zone decree of 28 February 1984 indicated that with regard to defined areas of its exclusive economic zone, where the establishment of special mandatory measures for the prevention of pollution from vessels is required for technical reasons in relation to their oceanographical and ecological conditions, such measures, including those relating to navigational practice, may be established by the Council of Ministers. The possible impact of this provision cannot as yet be judged.
91. Antigua and Barbuda, the Comoros, Cuba, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras, the Ivory Coast, Kiribati, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, the Philippines, Sao Tomé and Principe, the Solomon Islands, Thailand, Tuvalu, the USA, the USSR, Venezuela, and the Yemen.
92. Portugal, Qatar, Spain (pipelines have been omitted), and the United Arab Emirates.
93. Barbados, Cape Verde, St. Lucia, and the Seychelles.
94. Figures taken from Smith, op.cit. n. 6, p. 9.
95. As to an analysis of the negotiating process see Brown, E.D., ‘Delimitation of Offshore Areas’, 5 Marine Policy (1981) pp. 172–184 at p. 173 et seq.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
96. Bangladesh, Colombia, and Oman.
97. Burma, the Dominican Republic, Guyana, Iceland, India, Mauritania, Mauritius, New Zealand, Pakistan, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Vanuatu, Vietnam, and the Yemen.
98. Cambodia, Fiji, and the Solomon Islands.
99. Op.cit. n. 33a.
100. Declaration by Chile of 15 September 1985, Law of the Sea Bulletin, no. 7 (April 1986) pp. 107 and 108.Google Scholar