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Indirect Communication
2. Merleau‐Ponty and Lévi‐Strauss
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 July 2024
Extract
The philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961), Professor at the Collège de France as from 1952, radically influenced the course of phenomenology, turning it from Germany towards France. With Merleau-Ponty philosophy is sincere and searchingly intelligent, it begins to try as never before, it really exerts its strength towards a genuine human breakthrough at all levels of our experience. With Merleau-Ponty we find a respite from those traditions of mechanism and intellectualism which, starting from Descartes and Kant, have never ceased to plague the course of the philosophy of perception. With Merleau-Ponty, philosophy speaks simply, simply because things are so very difficult.
What interests Merleau-Ponty most perhaps is the classical philosophical problem of the Other, and our possible means of knowing him and communicating with him. In Merleau-Ponty we have a guide who is awake to every level of consciousness in the Other. He sees that communication with the Other is a matter of understanding that area where thoughts and actions are conceived, of moving, that is to say, behind the figure of the Other as he expresses himself in acts and words, in a search for meaning. We need to destroy in psychology and in philosophy the mindless collecting of facts and the refusal of synthesis together with all artificial dichotomising. We need to seek for the reality of the Other in a private or ‘inter-subjective’ space.
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- Copyright © 1966 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers
References
The Structure of Behaviour, trans. Fisher, A. L., Methuen, 1965, p. 222Google Scholar.
See Husserl, Edmund, Logique formelle et logique transcendantale, trans Bachelard, S., P.U.F., pp. 322–323Google Scholar, for example.
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Smith, Colin, Routledge 1962, p. 222Google Scholar.
Phenomenology of Perception, p. 185.
ibid, p. 186.
In a science where the observer is of the same nature as his object the observer is himself a part of which is observed'.(op. cit. p. xxvii)