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On Dualism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2024

H.O. Mounce
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Abstract

This is a response to two articles by William Charlton and Nicholas Lash. These authors criticize a view which they attribute to Descartes. According to this view, there is a dualism of mind and body. In this paper it is argued, first, that some form of dualism is intrinsically plausible, second, that the view these authors attribute to Descartes is not one he held and, third, that a dualism of mind or soul and body has always been central to the Christian faith. It concludes by considering Charlton's attempt to elucidate the Christian belief in an after life by reference to what he calls a process of divinisation. The importance of this process is not denied. It is argued, however, that it must itself involve a dualism of mind or soul and body.

Keywords

soulbodyDescartesChristianityimmortality
Type
Original Articles
Information
New Blackfriars , Volume 91 , Issue 1034 , July 2010 , pp. 401 - 407
Copyright
Copyright © The author 2009. Journal compilation © The Dominican Council

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References

1 “Are We Born and Do We Die” by Nicholas Lash, “Two Theories of Soul” by William Charlton, pp 403–13 and pp 424–41 New Blackfriars vol. 90, No 1028, July 2009.

2 Ibid, p. 429.

3 Ibid, p. 439.

4 Cf. ibid, p. 424.

5 Descartes: Selected Writings Sixth Meditation, CUP, 1988, pp. 116–7Google Scholar. In fairness to Lash it must be said that he hesitates at one point about whether “Cartesian dualism” can in fact be attributed to Descartes himself (see p. 405).