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Philosophy in the Seminary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2024

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This article is concerned with the practice of philosophy in religious institutions such as seminaries or the study-houses of religious orders. But it is clear that the possibility of such a limitation – the practice of philosophy in some particular setting – is itself problematic. Philosophizing would seem to claim that it is independent or can become independent of the setting of its practice in all relevant respects. Speaking as a theologian (as I intend to do throughout this article) and claiming therefore complete freedom to appeal to revelation in Scripture and the Church, I must maintain that there is one setting, one Sitz im Leben, of which philosophizing can never become independent: the concrete economy of sin and salvation which embraces humanity and the whole of creation with it. But to admit this is not yet to commit oneself to the view that the theological Sitz im Leben of philosophizing is philosophically relevant, i.e. that philosophical discourse is dependent for its shape and content on the theological existence of philosophers. If it is possible for any intellectual activity to release itself from the constraints of the concrete conditions of its exercise – we can think in spite of a feverish cold though not when we are delirious – then there would seem to be no obvious reason why philosophizing, the intellectual activity par excellence, should not precisely define itself as just that discourse which actively releases itself from the particularity of all and any concrete conditions of its exercise, including theological ones, by simple (though perhaps costing) pretermission or by reflexive objectivization.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1965 Provincial Council of the English Province of the Order of Preachers

References

1 A paper given to the Priests' Philosophical Group in December 1964. Some bibliographical references may be appropriate. R. Aubert, 'Le Concile du Vatican et la connaissance naturelle de Dieu'. LumVie (1954), 21-52: H.U. von Balthasar. Karl Barth (Kln 19622); H. Bouillard, Karl Barth (Paris 1958). esp. vol. III; G. Ebeling. 'Der hermeneutische Ort der Gotteslehre bei Petrus Lombardus und Thomas von Aquin'. ZtTheolKir, 61 (1964). 283-327 ; K. Jaspers. Der philosophische Glaube angesichrs der Offenbarung (Mnchen 1962); O. Pggeler, Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfllingen 1963); K. Rahner, Hrer des Wortes (Mnchen 19632).

2 E.g. Prov 8: 22-31 : Ecclus 24; Wis 7:22-8: 1. Cf.Jo 1 : 1-18; Heb 1 : 1-3. See J. Dupont Gnosis (Louvain-Paris 19602).

3 Catholic Christianity implies an ontology. It is for this general reason that I find unacceptable two recent Catholic reinterpretations of transsubstantiation, by Fr Charles Davis, in Sophia 3 (1964. Australia). 12-24, and by Fr Herbert McCabe O.P., in The Clergy Review 49 (1964). 749-59. Existential communication in speech and gesture is dependent upon and interpretative of communion in being, not just of human life lived.

4 I am not of course suggesting that the philosophical distinction of nature and existence coincides with the theological distinction of nature and ‘economy’ (grace and sin). But the philosophical distinction which I am employing as a theologian is open to particularization in theological terms, if for no other reason than that it is in itself vague and ambiguous and only acquires any kind of sharpness in a theological context. The distinction would seem to have relevance for the theology of marriage and of death.