The “East Asian miracle”, involving the phenomenal growth experience of countries such as South Korea and Taiwan, has attracted enormous intellectual attention in recent years. What has been striking in the development experience of countries like South Korea and Taiwan is not only their ability to achieve extremely high rates of economic growth, an average of nine to percent per annum sustained over the course of three decades, but also their capacity to combine these high rates of economic growth with equally striking performances in relation to other major indicators of development. These, in turn, include a relatively egalitarian pattern of income distribution, eradication of absolute poverty on a broad scale, significant employment creation as well as the virtual absence of macroeconomic crises. The Turkish experience also constitutes an interesting case of late industrialization from a comparative perspective. It is clearly a case of moderate success judged by the East Asian standards of economic growth. Furthermore, Turkey has displayed patterns of income inequality and macroeconomic instability that are, in many ways, closer to “Latin American” standards. Yet, from a different perspective, when we exclude the East Asian superperformers from our sample, Turkey’s growth performance, an average of five to six percent per annum over time, compares favorably with other late industrializers. Indeed, what makes Turkey particularly interesting and somewhat unique from a comparative perspective is that these reasonably high rates of economic growth and the creation of a substantial industrial base over time have been accomplished within the framework of broadly democratic institutions during the post-war period.
