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Factors Affecting Welfare Gains From Fishing Gear Restrictions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2017

Eric E. Anderson
Eric E. Anderson*
Affiliation:
Old Dominion University
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Abstract

While the use of gear restrictions to regulate fishing activity seldom has the objective of improving economic efficiency, it is capable of achieving that result under some conditions. It can also reduce economic efficiency. This paper explores the way several factors affect the sign and magnitude of welfare gains from fishing gear restrictions. These factors include, among others: the fixity or variability of the price of fish and the presence or absence of diminishing short-run average product of effort. Some generalizations are offered regarding the characteristics of fisheries in which gear restrictions are most likely to produce welfare gains.

Type
Articles
Information
Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 2 , October 1988 , pp. 156 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © 1988 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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Footnotes

Lee Anderson, Stephen Crutchfield, John Gates, Gary Johnson, William Kolberg, George Parsons, and Robert Rosenman made valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.

References

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