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The Use of Liability Rules in Controlling Hazardous Waste Accidents: Theory and Practice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 May 2017

James J. Opaluch
James J. Opaluch*
Affiliation:
Department of Resource Economics, University of Rhode Island, Kingston
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Extract

Economists since Pigou have advocated the use of economic incentives for controlling environmental degradation. In a similar vein, environmental economists have long lamented a near unanimous reliance of environmental policy on the use of direct regulation. However, several pieces of legislation, as well as common law doctrine, provide strict liability for damages from a variety of pollution incidents. The term strict liability means that a polluter is liable for the penalty imposed for a pollution incident irrespective of intent, fault, or even knowledge of the pollution incident. Negligence need not be proved, thus strict liability allows for no defense of due care or conformance with common practice.

Type
AAEA/NAREA Invited Session: Economics of Hazardous Waste Disposal
Information
Northeastern Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics , Volume 13 , Issue 2 , October 1984 , pp. 210 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © 1984 Northeastern Agricultural and Resource Economics Association 

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Footnotes

This research was supported by the University of Rhode Island Sea Grant Program and by the Rhode Island Agricultural Experiment Station. (AES Contribution #2237).

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