This is a major book that showcases the breadth of the scholarly imagination of its two coauthors, who offer a compelling theory of the origins and evolution of revolutionary dictatorships. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way develop their argument by analyzing 20 regimes that emerged after social revolutions involving an overthrow of the ancien régime from below, followed by a program of transformation of the state and society (p. 5). In the authors’ view, three pathways are possible for revolutionary states. In the ideal-typical sequence, they pursue radical transformation, thus unleashing a domestic counterrevolutionary reaction that may also be accompanied by foreign conflict. When this reactive sequence is completed and the conflicts are resolved, radical revolutionary states establish the three pillars of durable authoritarianism: a cohesive ruling elite, a highly developed and loyal coercive apparatus, and the elimination of rival organizations and alternative centers of power (pp. 4–5). Not all dictatorships follow this ideal-typical sequence that culminates in authoritarian durability by inoculating regimes against elite defections, military coups, and mass protest (p. 5). A second trajectory is also possible in which radicalism leads to early regime death due to geopolitical vulnerability and military conflict. Finally, there is a third path in which initial radicalism is tempered in favor of accommodation; this limits the extent of counterrevolutionary conflict and therefore stunts the development of the three pillars of durable authoritarianism associated with the ideal-typical radical revolutionary regimes. This theory is impressive in scope.
The book is based on extensive research. The bibliography lists close to 2,000 sources in English but also in Spanish, along with some in Russian and German. The authors also make use of declassified intelligence assessments produced by entities like the CIA and the Department of State. In terms of method, Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way supplement their rich historical case studies with detailed coding and statistical analysis of the survival of revolutionary dictatorships, conducted jointly with Adam Casey and Jean Lachapelle. One of the many strengths of the book is that the coding criteria are explicitly laid out, thereby enabling other scholars to conduct further analysis and replication.
The general argument unfolds through a series of case studies of ideal-typical radical revolutionary regimes (the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and Vietnam); of radical failures (the Hungarian Soviet Republic [1919], Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, and Afghanistan under the Taliban in the 1990s); and of radicalism turned to accommodation (Algeria, Bolivia, and Nicaragua). These case studies are detailed and informative. Different scholars will likely focus on different cases. I found three sets of cases to be the most suggestive. First are regimes that remain relatively unknown in the literature, such as the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which existed only for several months in 1919. The discussion of this case (pp. 251–255) brings to light a paradigmatic instance of an abortive reactive sequence that leads to the early death of a radical regime. The second group includes various examples where the consolidation of the three pillars was incomplete: radical regimes that proved durable despite not developing all three pillars of durable authoritarianism (Mozambique, Rwanda, and Eritrea); complex cases like Mexico and Iran that endured for a very long time despite not having the full complement of the three pillars; and, finally, accommodationist regimes like oil-rich Algeria, which lasted for six decades with only one of the three pillars of durable authoritarianism in place (pp. 319, 342). Because understanding political processes in negative cases is important for any theory of revolutionary durability, the third group includes nonrevolutionary regimes. Here the authors focus on Ghana (pp. 194–200), where the nonrevolutionary Nkrumah regime (1957–66) implemented accommodationist policies and thus failed to unleash the counterrevolutionary reaction that catalyzes the creation of the three pillars of authoritarian durability; as anticipated by the theory, in the absence of these pillars, the regime ended after a coup (pp. 195–200). These case studies will be appreciated by scholars for a long time to come.
In addition to the case studies, another strength of the book is that its argument extends past the end of the Cold War. Although 18 of the 20 cases of revolutionary dictatorships do emerge before 1989, the authors highlight Eritrea and Rwanda as durable revolutionary regimes born in the 1990s (pp. 337–41). These two examples are important not only because they demonstrate that social revolutions are not extinct historical phenomena but also because they showcase important differences between Cold War and post–Cold War revolutionary dictatorships. Both Rwanda and Eritrea have proven to be durable although neither has developed the elite cohesion pillar, which is deemed essential for regime durability in the ideal-typical radical revolutionary scenario that unfolded in regimes like Cuba, Vietnam, or Albania. A puzzle raised by the authors that will stimulate future research is how regimes that emerge from social revolutions after the Cold War differ from those established earlier in the twentieth century.
A book of this breadth invites further scholarly reflection. One question that arises concerns the scope conditions for the argument about the three pillars of authoritarian durability. As the authors make clear, these pillars develop fully only in a subset of the 20 revolutionary regimes analyzed. Four such regimes are identified through the in-depth case studies presented in chapters 2–8 (the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, and Cuba), whereas another two are discussed in the concluding chapter 9: Albania and, surprisingly, Angola, where according to the authors the MPLA eliminated all organized opposition (p. 335)—although some might question how that squares with the fact that UNITA today controls more than 40% of the seats in the Angolan National Assembly. These six regimes are the only ones that score 3 out of 3 on the development of the three pillars of durable authoritarianism: elite cohesion, a strong and loyal coercive apparatus, and the destruction of independent power centers (pp. 319, 342). What these regimes have in common is that five are unquestionably communist (the Soviet Union, China, Vietnam, Cuba, and Albania) and the sixth (Angola) is considered by many scholars to have been communist (though I would place it in the communist penumbra, a category that includes regimes that belong only partially to the communist set). This suggests that communist revolutionary regimes may possess an advantage over noncommunist revolutionary regimes in fully developing the three pillars of authoritarian durability.
Focusing on communist regimes allows us to productively extend the argument presented in this book. Following convention, the authors exclude 13 regimes from the analysis because they were under “foreign control” (pp. 394–408). Nine of those regimes are communist: three of these are conventionally understood as revolutionary (Mongolia, North Korea, and Laos), and six are usually labeled nonrevolutionary (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary [1947–1990], Poland, and Romania). Conventions are to be respected, although as the book repeatedly indicates, evidence of foreign control or at least influence can be detected in regimes that are included in the analysis, such as Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola; we might also add that China experienced substantial Soviet assistance until the late 1950s and that Albania underwent a period of close links with China in the initial decade after the Sino–Soviet split.
Few regimes can be described as truly independent, especially during the period of heightened Cold War geopolitical rivalry. I feel that the inclusion of Mongolia, North Korea, and Laos in the analysis would have produced additional revolutionary communist cases in which the three pillars of durable authoritarianism are fully developed. Moreover, had the six nonrevolutionary cases been included, this would have revealed that the full development of the three pillars of authoritarian durability is not limited simply to the subset of communist revolutionary regimes but can also be found in most of the nonrevolutionary communist regimes (except Poland, where independent power centers were not destroyed during communism). Thus, although the inclusion of a nonrevolutionary noncommunist regime like Ghana (1957–66) in the study shows that it did not develop the three pillars of durable authoritarianism, scholars might wonder whether an in-depth analysis of the six nonrevolutionary Eastern European communist regimes (which, unlike Ghana, were very durable) might generate productive arguments regarding the reinforcing effects of communist rule, be it revolutionary or not, on the three pillars and by extension on regime durability. These lines of inquiry can be taken up by future scholarship.
This is an impressive study that distills the expertise of its two distinguished authors. It will be of interest to a broad audience of social scientists, especially political scientists, sociologists, and historians. Students of authoritarian politics will welcome its insights about revolutionary origins and regime durability. The book will also do what only a handful of studies achieve: it will stimulate research for a long time to come.
