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Against Regular and Irregular Characterizations of Mechanisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Lane DesAutels
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Abstract

This article addresses the question of whether we should conceive of mechanisms as productive of change in a regular way. I argue that, if mechanisms are characterized as fully regular, on the one hand, then not enough processes will count as mechanisms for them to be interesting or useful. If no appeal to regularity is made at all in their characterization, on the other hand, then mechanisms can no longer be useful for grounding prediction and supporting intervention strategies. I conclude that, if the New Mechanistic Philosophy is to be successful, a stochastic characterization of mechanisms must be adopted.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 5 , December 2011 , pp. 914 - 925
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I thank Lindley Darden, Tudor Baetu, Robert Richardson, Bill Bechtel, Roberta Millstein, Peggy DesAutels, and Nancy Cartwright for their helpful comments, both in personal correspondence and at the PSA meeting in Montreal.

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