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Against the Monism of The Moment: A Reply to Elliott Sober

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Philip Kitcher
Philip Kitcher*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota
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Abstract

In his “Discussion” (1984), Elliott Sober offers some criticisms of the view about species—pluralistic realism—advocated in my 1984. Sober's comments divide into three parts. He attempts to show that species are not sets; he responds to my critique of David Hull's thesis that species are individuals; and he offers some arguments for the claim that species are “chunks of the genealogical nexus.” I consider each of these objections in turn, arguing that each of them fails. I attempt to use Sober's insightful critique to explain and defend pluralistic realism more fully.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , December 1984 , pp. 616 - 630
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1984

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to David Lewis for some constructive criticisms.

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