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Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence: A Reply to Andrew Wayne

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Wayne C. Myrvold
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Abstract

Andrew Wayne (1995) discusses some recent attempts to account, within a Bayesian framework, for the “common methodological adage” that “diverse evidence better confirms a hypothesis than does the same amount of similar evidence” (112). One of the approaches considered by Wayne is that suggested by Howson and Urbach (1989/1993) and dubbed the “correlation approach” by Wayne. This approach is, indeed, incomplete, in that it neglects the role of the hypothesis under consideration in determining what diversity in a body of evidence is relevant diversity. In this paper, it is shown how this gap can be filled, resulting in a more satisfactory account of the evidential role of diversity of evidence. In addition, it is argued that Wayne's criticism of the correlation approach does not indicate a serious flaw in the approach.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 661 - 665
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

The author would like to thank Georgios Asteris and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments and suggestions.

‡

Send reprint requests to the author, 6 Brook Street, Sherborn, MA 01770.

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