Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-jkksz Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T17:36:56.744Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Beliefs and Subdoxastic States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Stephen P. Stich
Stephen P. Stich*
Affiliation:
University of Maryland
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

It is argued that the intuitively sanctioned distinction between beliefs and non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs is a distinction worth preserving in cognitive psychology. The intuitive distinction is argued to rest on a pair of features exhibited by beliefs but not by subdoxastic states. These are access to consciousness and inferential integration. Harman's view, which denies the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states, is discussed and criticized.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 4 , December 1978 , pp. 499 - 518
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

†

I am indebted to Clayton Lewis and Robert Cummins for helpful criticism of the views set forth in this paper.

References

[1] Anderson, J. and Bower, G. Human Associative Memory. Washington: John Wiley and Sons, 1974.Google Scholar
[2] Austin, J. L. Sense and Sensibilia. New York: Oxford University Press, 1964.Google Scholar
[3] Chomsky, N. and Katz, J. “What the Linguist Is Talking About.” Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974): 347–367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Dretske, F. Seeing and Knowing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.Google Scholar
[5] Graves, C., Katz, J., et. al. “Tacit Knowledge.” Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 318–330.10.2307/2025319CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[6] Haber, R. N. and Hershenson, M. The Psychology of Visual Perception. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973.Google Scholar
[7] Harman, G. Thought. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973.Google Scholar
[8] Hess, E. H. “Attitude and Pupil Size.” Scientific American 212 (1965):10.1038/scientificamerican0465-46CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
[9] Hess, E. H. “The Role of Pupil Size in Communication.” Scientific American 233 (1975):CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
[10] Julesz, J. The Cyclopean Eye. New York: Academic Press, 1970.Google Scholar
[11] Moran, T. P. The Symbolic Imagery Hypothesis: A Production System Model. Ph.D. Dissertation, Carnegie-Mellon University, 1973.Google Scholar
[12] Newell, A. and Simon, H. Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1973.Google Scholar
[13] Pylyshyn, Z. “What The Mind's Eye Tells The Mind's Brain: A Critique on Mental Imagery.” Psychological Bulletin 80 (1973):10.1037/h0034650CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[14] Stich, S. P. “What Every Speaker Knows.” Philosophical Review 80 (1971): 476–496.10.2307/2183754CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[15] Stich, S. P. “Competence and Indeterminacy.” In Testing Linguistic Hypotheses, Cohen, D. and Wirth, J. R., Eds. Washington: John Wiley, 1975.Google Scholar
[16] Winograd, T. “Understanding Natural Language.” Cognitive Psychology 3 (1972): 1–191.CrossRefGoogle Scholar