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Causal Democracy and Causal Contributions in Developmental Systems Theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Susan Oyama
Susan Oyama*
Affiliation:
John Jay College of Criminal Justice and the Graduate Center, CUNY
*
†Send requests for reprints to the author, 924 West End Ave., #44, New York, NY 10025-3540.
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Abstract

In reworking a variety of biological concepts, Developmental Systems Theory (DST) has made frequent use of parity of reasoning. We have done this to show, for instance, that factors that have similar sorts of impact on a developing organism tend nevertheless to be invested with quite different causal importance. We have made similar arguments about evolutionary processes. Together, these analyses have allowed DST not only to cut through some age-old muddles about the nature of development, but also to effect a long-delayed reintegration of development into evolutionary theory.

Our penchant for causal symmetry, however (or ‘causal democracy’, as it has recently been termed), has sometimes been misunderstood. This paper shows that causal symmetry is neither a platitude about multiple influences nor a denial of useful distinctions, but a powerful way of exposing hidden assumptions and opening up traditional formulations to fruitful change.

Information

Type
Philosophy of Biology, Psychology, and Neuroscience
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 67 , Issue S3: Supplement. Proceedings of the 1998 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers Sep., 2000 , 2000 , pp. S332 - S347
Copyright
Copyright © 2000 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful to Peter Godfrey-Smith and Rasmus Winther for comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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