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Causality and Explanation: A Reply to Two Critiques

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Wesley C. Salmon
Wesley C. Salmon*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh and Universität Konstanz
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, 1001 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260.
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Abstract

This paper discusses several distinct process theories of causality offered in recent years by Phil Dowe and me. It addresses problems concerning the explication of causal process, causal interaction, and causal transmission, whether given in terms of transmission of marks, transmission of invariant or conserved quantities, or mere possession of conserved quantities. Renouncing the mark-transmission and invariant quantity criteria, I accept a conserved quantity theory similar to Dowe's—differing basically with respect to causal transmission. This paper also responds to several fundamental constructive criticisms contained in Christopher Hitchcock's discussion of both the mark-transmission and the conserved quantity theories.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 3 , September 1997 , pp. 461 - 477
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1997

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Footnotes

‡

I should like to express my gratitude to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for support of research embodied in this paper and to the University of Konstanz for providing a congenial environment in which to carry it out. My thanks also go to Paul Hoyningen-Huene and Johanna Seibt for helpful and clarifying comments on the issues here addressed. I am most especially grateful to Phil Dowe, Christopher Hitchcock, and Philip Kitcher for their insightful contributions to the discussion of causal explanation.

References

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