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The Coincidences of Time Travel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Phil Dowe
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Abstract

In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. I conclude that unless there is something faulty in the conception of explanation implicit in Horwich's argument, time travel presents us with nothing that is inexplicable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 70 , Issue 3 , July 2003 , pp. 574 - 589
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Paul Horwich, Jossi Berkovich, Nick Smith, an anonymous referee, and audiences at London, Jerusalem, Hobart, and Melbourne for helpful comments.

References

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