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Commentary on Alison Gopnik's “The Scientist As Child”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Miriam Solomon
Miriam Solomon*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Temple University
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Type
Article Commentary
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 63 , Issue 4 , December 1996 , pp. 547 - 551
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1996

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Footnotes

†

Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, Temple University, Humanities 022–32, Philadelphia, PA 19122.

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