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Discovery and Justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Carl R. Kordig
Carl R. Kordig*
Affiliation:
Georgetown University
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Abstract

The distinction between discovery and justification is ambiguous. This obscures the debate over a logic of discovery. For the debate presupposes the distinction. Real discoveries are well established. What is well established is justified. The proper distinctions are three: initial thinking, plausibility, and acceptability. Logic is not essential to initial thinking. We do not need good supporting reasons to initially think of an hypothesis. Initial thoughts need be neither plausible nor acceptable. Logic is essential, as Hanson noted, to both plausibility and acceptability. An hypothesis needs good supporting reasons to be either plausible or acceptable. Such reasons need not be relative to the particular scientific theory undergoing test at the time. There is no fundamental difference between reasons relevant to plausibility and acceptability. The difference is one of degree. Acceptability requires more than plausibility.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 45 , Issue 1 , March 1978 , pp. 110 - 117
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1978

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Footnotes

†

Earlier versions of this paper were read at the Minnesota Center for the Philosophy of Science (April, 1974), the Washington Philosophy Club (February, 1975), and Memphis State University (February, 1976). A referee's comments for this journal were quite helpful.

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