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Discussion: Wright on Teleological Descriptions of Goal-Directed Behavior

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Lowell Nissen
Lowell Nissen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy University of Arkansas
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Abstract

Larry Wright's analysis of teleological description of goal-directed behavior, though ingenious and insightful, errs in the following ways: it incorrectly claims that intentional human action exhibits consequence-etiology, making it impossible, contrary to his claim, for reference to consequence-etiology to be metaphorically transmitted to teleological descriptions of nonhuman behavior; it does not remove the threat of reverse causation for nonhuman behavior; it assumes in the face of contrary evidence that reference to purpose drops out in metaphorical extension; and it cannot account for unrequired behavior directed toward impossible goals.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 50 , Issue 1 , March 1983 , pp. 151 - 158
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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References

Braithwaite, R. B. (1953), Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Wright, L. (1968), “The Case against Teleological Reductionism”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19: 211–223.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wright, L. (1976), Teleological Explanations: An Etiological Analysis of Goals and Functions. Berkeley: University of California Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar