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Epistemic Loops and Measurement Realism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Alistair M. C. Isaac
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Abstract

Recent philosophy of measurement has emphasized the existence of both diachronic and synchronic “loops,” or feedback processes, in the epistemic achievements of measurement. A widespread response has been to conclude that measurement outcomes do not convey interest-independent facts about the world and that only a coherentist epistemology of measurement is viable. In contrast, I argue that a form of measurement realism is consistent with these results. The insight is that antecedent structure in measuring spaces constrains our empirical procedures such that successful measurement conveys a limited but veridical knowledge of “fixed points,” or modally stable, interest-independent features of the world.

Type
Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 86 , Issue 5 , December 2019 , pp. 930 - 941
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

This article benefited from conversations with Teru Miyake, Eran Tal, George Smith, and J. E. Wolff, as well as the comments of participants at the PSA 2018 session on measurement.

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