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Epistemic Values and the Argument from Inductive Risk

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Daniel Steel
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Abstract

Critics of the ideal of value-free science often assume that they must reject the distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. I argue that this assumption is mistaken and that the distinction can be used to clarify and defend the argument from inductive risk, which challenges the value-free ideal. I develop the idea that the characteristic feature of epistemic values is that they promote, either intrinsically or extrinsically, the attainment of truths. This proposal is shown to answer common objections to the distinction and provide a principled basis for separating legitimate from illegitimate influences of nonepistemic values in scientific inference.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 1 , January 2010 , pp. 14 - 34
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Kyle Whyte and three anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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