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Feigl's ‘Scientific Realism’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Matthias Neuber
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Abstract

This article considers the evolution of Feigl's attempt at establishing a stable form of scientific realism. I will argue that Feigl's work in that area should be appreciated for two reasons: (1) it represents a telling case against the view of there being an unbridgeable ‘analytic-continental divide’ in the context of twentieth-century philosophy; (2) it contradicts the idea that scientific realism is at odds with logical empiricism. It will be shown that Feigl developed his scientific realist position from within the logical empiricists’ Vienna Circle. This, in turn, necessitates a fresh approach toward the contemporary scientific realism debate.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 78 , Issue 1 , January 2011 , pp. 165 - 183
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I wish to thank Brian Bodensteiner and an anonymous reviewer of this journal for very helpful suggestions and comments.

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