Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-xbtfd Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T12:20:41.697Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Goodman, ‘Grue’ and Hempel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

C. A. Hooker
C. A. Hooker*
Affiliation:
York University
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

It is now commonly accepted that N. Goodman's predicate “grue” presents the theory of confirmation of C. G. Hempel (and other such theories) with grave difficulties. The precise nature and status of these “difficulties” has, however, never been made clear. In this paper it is argued that it is very unlikely that “grue” raises any formal difficulties for Hempel and appearances to the contrary are examined, rejected and an explanation of their intuitive appeal offered. However “grue” is shown to raise an informal, “over-arching” difficulty of great magnitude for all theories of confirmation, including Hempel's theory.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , September 1968 , pp. 232 - 247
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1968

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

[1] Goodman, N., “A Query on Confirmation,” Journal of Philosophy, vol. 63, 1946, pp. 383–385.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[2] Goodman, N., Fact, Fiction and Forecast, Harvard University Press, 1955.Google Scholar
[3] Hempel, C. G., “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind, vol. LIV, 1945, pp. 1–26, 97–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[4] Hempel, C. G., “A Purely Syntactical Definition of Confirmation,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 8, 1943, pp. 121–143.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Hempel, C. G., Aspects of Scientific Explanation, The Free Press, 1965.Google Scholar
[6] Stove, D., “Hempel's Paradox,” Dialogue, vol. IV, No. 4, 1966, pp. 444–455.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[7] Stove, D., “On Logical Definitions of Confirmation,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, vol. XVI, Feb., 1966.Google Scholar

A correction has been issued for this article:

Errata