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Hume, Norton, and Induction without Rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Thomas Kelly
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Abstract

Does Hume's skeptical critique of inductive reasoning depend for its force on the assumption that such reasoning is a matter of following general rules? I explore this question in connection with John Norton's “Material Theory of Induction.”

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 77 , Issue 5 , December 2010 , pp. 754 - 764
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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