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In Defense of the Requirement of Total Evidence

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Paul Draper
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Abstract

According to the Requirement of Total Evidence, when assessing the credibility of hypotheses, we should endeavor to take into account all of the relevant evidence at our disposal instead of just some proper part of that evidence. In “The Fine-Tuning Argument and the Requirement of Total Evidence,” Peter Fisher Epstein offers two alleged counterexamples to this requirement. I show that, on at least one very natural interpretation of the requirement, his alleged counterexamples are not genuine. I close by explaining why this conclusion is important.

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Type
Discussion
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Philosophy of Science , Volume 87 , Issue 1 , January 2020 , pp. 179 - 190
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am grateful to Kaila Draper, Joel Pust, and an anonymous referee for their very helpful comments.

References

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