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Lawlikeness and the End of Science

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

C. Z. Elgin
C. Z. Elgin*
Affiliation:
Michigan State University
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Abstract

Although our theories are not precisely true, scientific realists contend that we should admit their objects into our ontology. One justification—offered by Sellars and Putnam—is that current theories belong to series that converge to ideally adequate theories. I consider the way the commitment to convergence reflects on the interpretation of lawlike claims. I argue that the distinction between lawlike and accidental generalizations depends on our cognitive interests and reflects our commitment to the direction of scientific progress. If the sciences disagree about the lawlikeness of some generalization(s), as an argument of Davidson's suggests, it follows from the interest relatively of lawlikeness that the laws of a science do not determine the essences of their objects. I conclude that this form of scientific realism provides no metaphysical support for essentialism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 1 , March 1980 , pp. 56 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1980

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to Jonathon Adler, Richard Burian, Vicki Choy Levine, Hilary Putnam, and the referee for Philosophy of Science for helpful comments concerning earlier versions of this paper.

References

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