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Operant Conditioning and a Paradox of Teleology

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Jon Ringen
Jon Ringen*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University at South Bend
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Abstract

The ambiguity to which Porpora (1980) objects in Wright's (1972, 1976) analysis of goal-directedness permits certain counterexamples to Porpora's analysis to be easily accommodated by Wright's. As a consequence, Ringen's (1976) claim that some operant behavior is goal-directed is in accord with Wright's analysis and with certain features of common sense that Wright's analysis captures. However, the way our commonsense conception of goal-directedness accommodates some of the counterexamples to Porpora's analysis suggests an intimate connection between goal-directedness and intentional notions like belief and desire. This suggests a possible criticism of Ringen and highlights problematic aspects of contemporary folk psychology.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 4 , December 1985 , pp. 565 - 577
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to Jay Semel, Director of University House, University of Iowa, for making the facilities of University House available to me during fall semester, 1983. Without that help, this paper would not have been written. An earlier version of the paper was presented at the University of Minnesota, Duluth, spring, 1984.

References

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