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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
“… there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.”
“… Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”
One example which Peirce chose to illustrate his pragmatic maxim as thus stated was the familiar theological distinction between transubstantiation and consubstantiation. Now (Peirce says) since these two doctrines agree in all of the effects which they conceive the sacrament to possess and which may have practical bearings, here and hereafter, it is absurd to say that there is any real distinction between the two doctrines. Peirce declares in the same passage that, having used the question as a logical example only, he does not care to pause to anticipate the theologian's reply.