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Realist Foundations of Measurement

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Henry C. Byerly  and
Vincent A. Lazara
Henry C. Byerly
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
Vincent A. Lazara
Affiliation:
University of Arizona
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Abstract

This paper defends a realist interpretation of theories and a modest realism concerning the existence of quantities as providing the best account both of the logic of quantity concepts and of scientific measurement practices. Various operationist analyses of measurement are shown to be inadequate accounts of measurement practices used by scientists. We argue, furthermore, that appeals to implicit definitions to provide meaning for theoretical terms over and above operational definitions fail because implicit definitions cannot generate the requisite descriptive content. The special case of establishing a temperature scale is examined to show that nonrealist accounts fail to provide insight into the theoretical connections that scientific laws postulate to hold among quantities.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 40 , Issue 1 , March 1973 , pp. 10 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © 1973 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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