Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 April 2022
Despite influencing the social sciences since the 1930s, S. S. Stevens' “operationist” philosophy of science has yet to be adequately understood. I reconstruct Stevens' operationism from his early work and assess the influence of various views (logical positivism, behaviorism and the “operational viewpoint” of P. W. Bridgman, among others) on Stevens. Stevens' operationism emerges, on my reconstruction, as a naturalistic methodological directive aimed at agreement, founded in turn on the belief that agreement is constitutive of science, the scientific community, and objectivity. Further, I show that operationism is historically and philosophically independent of the views mentioned above.
I thank I. B. Cohen, Valerie Gray Hardcastle, Gerald Holton, Deborah Mayo, Bert Moyer, Alan Richardson, Fred Suppe, W. v. O. Quine, Maila Walter, Sheldon White, the staff of the Harvard University Archives, and audiences at Virginia Tech and M.I.T. for comments, assistance, and discussion of this topic. I am particularly grateful to Michelle Little for research assistance, and to Geraldine Stevens for gracious aid and discussion. Support for the work leading to this paper was provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University and the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology at M.I.T.
Address requests for reprints to the author at garyh@vt.edu or Department of Philosophy 0126, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Blacksburg, VA 24061-0126.