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Scientific Representation, Interpretation, and Surrogative Reasoning

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Gabriele Contessa
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Abstract

In this paper, I develop Mauricio Suárez's distinction between denotation, epistemic representation, and faithful epistemic representation. I then outline an interpretational account of epistemic representation, according to which a vehicle represents a target for a certain user if and only if the user adopts an interpretation of the vehicle in terms of the target, which would allow them to perform valid (but not necessarily sound) surrogative inferences from the model to the system. The main difference between the interpretational conception I defend here and Suárez's inferential conception is that the interpretational account is a substantial account—interpretation is not just a “symptom” of representation; it is what makes something an epistemic representation of a something else.

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Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 74 , Issue 1 , January 2007 , pp. 48 - 68
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I would like to thank Nancy Cartwright and Mauricio Suárez for their helpful comments on previous versions of this article.

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