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Scientific Structuralism: Presentation and Representation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Katherine Brading  and
Elaine Landry
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Abstract

This paper explores varieties of scientific structuralism. Central to our investigation is the notion of ‘shared structure’. We begin with a description of mathematical structuralism and use this to point out analogies and disanalogies with scientific structuralism. Our particular focus is the semantic structuralist's attempt to use the notion of shared structure to account for the theory-world connection, this use being crucially important to both the contemporary structural empiricist and realist. We show why minimal scientific structuralism is, at the very least, a powerful methodological standpoint. Our investigation also makes explicit what more must be added to this minimal structuralist position in order to address the theory-world connection, namely, an account of representation.

Information

Type
The Semantic View of Theories, Scientific Structuralism, and Structural Realism
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 73 , Issue 5: Proceedings of the 2004 Biennial Meeting of The Philosophy of Science Association. Part II: Symposia Papers. Edited by Miriam Solomon , December 2006 , pp. 571 - 581
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

Our thanks to the symposium participants: Bas van Fraassen, Steven French, Martin Thomson-Jones, Stathis Psillos, and Juha Saatsi; and to all those who provided such valuable questions and comments during the discussion period.

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