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The Semantic View, If Plausible, Is Syntactic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

Hans Halvorson
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Abstract

Halvorson argues that the semantic view of theories leads to absurdities. Glymour shows how to inoculate the semantic view against Halvorson’s criticisms, namely, by making it into a syntactic view of theories. I argue that this modified semantic-syntactic view cannot do the philosophical work that the original “language-free” semantic view was supposed to do.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 80 , Issue 3 , July 2013 , pp. 475 - 478
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

These ideas were sharpened in conversations with Jim Weatherall.

References

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