Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2022
This article presents a new framework for the analysis of experimental control. The framework highlights different functions for experimental controls in the realization of an experiment: experimental controls that serve as tests and experimental controls that serve as probes. The approach to experimental control proposed here can illuminate the constitutive role of controls in knowledge production, and it sheds new light on the notion of exploratory experimentation. It also clarifies what can and what cannot be expected from reviewers of scientific journal articles giving feedback on experimental controls.
I wrote this article while I was a member of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study (Princeton, NJ). I am most grateful for the institute’s support of my work. Discussions with Ann-Sophie Barwich, Stuart Firestein, Stephan Güttinger, Miriam Solomon, and students and researchers at the Center for Science and Society at Columbia University (New York) and at the Consortium for the History of Science/Greater Philadelphia Philosophy Consortium (Philadelphia) helped me to develop my ideas on experimental control. I also wish to thank two anonymous referees for Philosophy of Science for their helpful comments on the penultimate version of this article.