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The Structure of Physical Explanation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

John Forge
John Forge*
Affiliation:
University of New South Wales
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Abstract

Some features of physical science relevant for a discussion of physical explanation are mentioned. The D-N account of physical explanation is discussed, and it is seen to restrict the scope of explanation in physical science because it imposes the requirement that the explanandum must be deducible from the explanans. Analysis shows that an alternative view of scientific explanation, called the instance view, allows a wider range of physical explanations. The view is seen to be free from a certain class of counter examples to the D-N theory.

Information

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 47 , Issue 2 , June 1980 , pp. 203 - 226
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1980

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to John Bishop, Peter Burton, Barbara Davidson, Jim McKenzie and especially to this journal's anonymous referee for comments on earlier versions of this paper.

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