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Using Democratic Values in Science: An Objection and (Partial) Response

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2022

S. Andrew Schroeder
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Abstract

Many philosophers of science have argued that social and ethical values have a significant role to play in core parts of the scientific process. This naturally suggests the following question: when such value choices need to be made, which or whose values should be used? A common answer to this question turns to democratic values—the values of the public or its representatives. I argue that this imposes a morally significant burden on certain scientists, effectively requiring them to advocate for policy positions they strongly disagree with. I conclude by discussing under what conditions this burden might be justified.

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Type
Values in Science
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 84 , Issue 5 , December 2017 , pp. 1044 - 1054
Copyright
Copyright © The Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

For comments on previous versions of this article, I thank Alex Rajczi, the students in a seminar on science and values at Claremont McKenna College, and especially the attendees at the 2016 Philosophy of Science Association meeting. For discussions on related topics, I thank Gil Hersch, Daniel Steel, and Branwen Williams. This work was supported in part by a research grant from Claremont McKenna College’s Center for Innovation and Entrepreneurship.

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