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What is Explained in Science?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Barbara Tuchańska
Barbara Tuchańska*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Lódź
*
‡Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, University of Lódź, Matejki 34, PL-90-237, Lódź, POLAND.
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Abstract

The fundamental problem of what is explained in science should be considered and clarified since it determines the way of solving the problem of how something is explained as well as the entire view of explanation. In the first section after the introduction, Hempel's models of explanation are criticized for their narrow concern with logical reconstruction. In the next section a broader epistemological approach to explanation is presented, and in the last section an historical example of Newtonian explanation as epistemic activity is discussed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 59 , Issue 1 , March 1992 , pp. 102 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © Philosophy of Science Association 1992

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Footnotes

†

The first draft of this paper was prepared during my stay at the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh in 1988. I am grateful to the Center for providing me with the opportunity to work on this paper and personally to Nicholas Rescher for his assistance. I also wish to thank Anne Hiskes, Adolf Grünbaum, and Victor Rodriquez for their helpful comments.

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