Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-j824f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-10T13:10:26.911Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

Alternatives and Incommensurables: The Case of Darwin and Kelvin

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

J. N. Hattiangadi*
Affiliation:
York University

Extract

If, as it is usually understood, incommensurable theories must be compatible then one need never choose between two such theories. But if theories were incompatible and incommensurable one would have to choose between them. What if they are incompatible only outside the domain of observation? The fact that Darwin's biology can clash with Kelvin's physics (each with their respective auxiliary assumptions) regarding the age of the earth shows how commensurable theories may yet be incompatible. But it also shows that they need not be alternatives—i.e. that one may not be able to simply and satisfactorily replace the other in our world view. But standard examples of scientific revolutions consist of the replacement of one theory by another in one's world view. These alternative theories must therefore be more than merely incompatible—what do they share if not content ? (I.e. they must be commensurable.)

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

My thanks are due to A. E. Musgrave and an anonymous referee whose critical comments led to considerable improvements in this paper.

References

[1] Darwin, C. The Origin of Species. 6th edition, first published 1871; 1st edition published 1859. Reprinted by The American Library of the World, New York, 1958.Google Scholar
[2] Eiseley, L. Darwin's Century. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961.Google Scholar
[3] Feyerabend, P. K. “Explanation, Reduction, Empiricism.” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 3. Edited by Feigl, H. and Maxwell, G. University of Minnesota Press, 1962.Google Scholar
[4] Feyerabend, P. K.On the ‘Meaning’ of Scientific Terms.” Journal of Philosophy 62 (1965).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
[5] Feyerabend, P. K. “Problems of Empiricism.” Beyond the Edge of Certainty. Edited by Colodny, R. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1965.Google Scholar
[6] Gillispie, C.The Formation of Lamarck's Evolutionary Theory.” Archives Internationale d'Historie des Sciences, vol. 9 (1957).Google Scholar
[7] Hattiangadi, J. N.Notes on the Theory of Rationality.” Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1970.Google Scholar
[8] Kelvin, Lord. See listing under “Thomson, Sir William.”Google Scholar
[9] Popper, K. R. The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson, 1959.Google Scholar
[10] Scheffler, I. Science and Subjectivity. New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1970.Google Scholar
[11] Shapère, D. “Meaning and Scientific Change.” Mind and Cosmos. Edited by Colodny, R. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966.Google Scholar
[12] Tarski, A. “On the Concept of Logical Consequence.” Reprinted in his Logic Semantics, Metamathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956.Google Scholar
[13] Thomson, Sir William or Kelvin, Lord. “On the Secular Cooling of the Earth.” Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. Reprinted in vol. 2 of Thomson and Tait, Principles of Mechanics and Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, 1962; (First published in 1879 under the title Treatise on Natural Philosophy), appendix D.Google Scholar
[14] Thomson, Sir William or Kelvin, Lord. “On the Age of the Sun's Heat,” originally published in Macmillan's Magazine, March, 1862. Reprinted in Thomson and Tait (see above) as appendix E.Google Scholar
[15] Watkins, J. W. N. “Against Normal Science.” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Edited by Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. Cambridge University Press, 1970.Google Scholar