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An Interpretation of Scientific Models Involving Analogies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

Jack C. Carloye*
Affiliation:
Washington State University

Extract

In order to account for the actual function of analogue models in extending theories to new domains, we argue that it is necessary to analyze the inference involved into a complex two dimensional form. This form must go horizontally from descriptions of entities used as a model to redescriptions of entities in the new domain, and it must go vertically from an observation language to a theoretical language having a different and exclusive logical syntax. This complex inference can only be intelligible if we interpret theoretical terms in a platonic manner, a la Körner.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © 1971 by The Philosophy of Science Association

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References

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