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Bayes and Beyond

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Geoffrey Hellman
Geoffrey Hellman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota
*
†Send reprint requests to the author, Department of Philosophy, College of Liberal Arts, University of Minnesota, 355 Ford Hall, 224 Church St. S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455.
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Abstract

Several leading topics outstanding after John Earman's Bayes or Bust? are investigated further, with emphasis on the relevance of Bayesian explication in epistemology of science, despite certain limitations. (1) Dutch Book arguments are reformulated so that their independence from utility and preference in epistemic contexts is evident. (2) The Bayesian analysis of the Quine-Duhem problem is pursued; the phenomenon of a “protective belt” of auxiliary statements around reasonably successful theories is explicated. (3) The Bayesian approach to understanding the superiority of variety of evidence is pursued; a recent challenge (by Wayne) is converted into a positive result on behalf of the Bayesian analysis, potentially with far-reaching consequences. (4) The condition for applying the merger-of-opinion results and the thesis of underdetermination of theories are compared, revealing significant limitations in applicability of the former. (5) Implications concerning “diachronic Dutch Book” arguments and “non-Bayesian shifts” are drawn, highlighting the incompleteness, but not incorrectness, of Bayesian analysis.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 64 , Issue 2 , June 1997 , pp. 191 - 221
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

‡

I am grateful to Colin Howson, Philip Kitcher, and Paul Teller for helpful correspondence, to Elliot Sober and Alfred Schramm for helpful discussion, and to a referee for critical comments.

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