Article contents
Better Theories
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 14 March 2022
Abstract
It is argued that a better theory neither (I) proves better at enabling us to realize our goals, nor (II) enables us to make more accurate predictions than a worse theory. (I) fails because it, tacitly, erroneously assumes, in talking of our goals, that individual preferences for theories can be aggregated into a social preference ordering; (II) fails because it cannot distinguish between important and unimportant predictions. Neither of these failures can be patched up by appealing to the notion of a true theory. The conclusion is that we as yet possess no adequate understanding of the relationships among theoretical progress, goal realization, and predictive accuracy.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © 1975 by the Philosophy of Science Association
Footnotes
I would like to thank Howard Cohen, Jonathan Rubinstein, Peter Unger, Lewis Wurgaft, and the referee of Philosophy of Science for their comments and criticisms.
References
REFERENCES
- 5
- Cited by