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Beyond Divorce: Current Status of the Discovery Debate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2022

Thomas Nickles
Thomas Nickles*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada, Reno
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Abstract

Does the viability of the discovery program depend on showing either (1) that methods of generating new problem solutions, per se, have special probative weight (the per se thesis); or, (2) that the original conception of an idea is logically continuous with its justification (anti-divorce thesis)? Many writers have identified these as the key issues of the discovery debate. McLaughlin, Pera, and others recently have defended the discovery program by attacking the divorce thesis, while Laudan has attacked the discovery program by rejecting the per se thesis. This disagreement over the central issue has led to communication breakdown. I contend that both friends and foes of discovery mistake the central issues. Recognizing a form of divorce helps rather than hurts the discovery program. However, the per se thesis is not essential to the program (nor is the related debate over novel prediction); hence, the status of the per se thesis is a side issue. With these clarifications in hand, we can proceed to the next stage of the discovery debate–the development (or revival) of a generative conception of justification which goes beyond consequentialism to forge a strong linkage of generation (or rather, generatability) with justification.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy of Science , Volume 52 , Issue 2 , June 1985 , pp. 177 - 206
Copyright
Copyright © 1985 by the Philosophy of Science Association

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Footnotes

†

I am indebted to the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, where I was a visiting fellow in 1982–83 when I wrote the first draft, and also to the National Science Foundation for partial support. For comments on earlier versions of these ideas, I thank Marcello Pera, Robert McLaughlin, Larry and Rachel Laudan, Andrew Lugg, James Woodward, John Worrall, Marjorie Grene, Kenneth Schaffner, and David Hull. I also received useful comments at York University and at the University of Maryland, College Park, where portions of the paper were presented in Spring, 1983.

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